

NOVEMBER 7, 2005

The American Conservative

The Next War?

Averting a Collision With China

James P. Pinkerton

ROGER SCRUTON

How I Became
A Conservative

JUSTIN RAIMONDO

Judith Miller,
War Party Pet

MARY EBERSTADT

Broken Homes,
Broken Children

America Dominated - And Now Dependent On Others For Its Standard of Living

How Can We Call Ourselves A "Super Power", If We Can't Even Support Ourselves

America is now so wholly dependent on foreign countries to finance its government, its consumption, and its production that we are becoming utterly helpless against the cohesive planned economic attack being waged by these other countries against us. The result of this is the buying out of our critical industries and resources and the crippling of many of our remaining American owned industries.

Total Foreign Control

Foreign countries financed 99% of our Government debt in 2004. They are on pace to take control of over \$700 Billion of US assets in 2005, up from \$617 Billion in 2004. On average, the IRS calculates that \$1 in \$4 spent in America on manufactured goods is imports. Certain key chokepoint industries in this country are almost totally controlled by foreign countries (Cement Industry 81% - Movie Industry 69% - TV Mfg. Industry 100%).

Buying Us Out With Our Own Money

As former Assistant Treasury Secretary under President Reagan, Paul Craig Roberts writes, the "result of many years of persistent trade surpluses with the United States, the Japanese government holds dollar reserves of \$1 Trillion. China's accumulation of dollars is approximately \$600 Billion. South Korea holds about \$200 Billion."

These dollars are buying us out and exerting control over our country, just as if we had lost a military war.

How does this happen?

1. Other countries use cheap labor, subsidized loan programs, and advanced technology to make and sell us goods cheaper than we can make them here in America.

2. Devastating "Free Trade" policies allow these countries collectively to target specific industries here in America and sell below cost. US manufacturers object but US consumers extol the ability to buy cheap foreign imports and temporarily improve their individual standard of living.

3. Facing subsidized foreign competitors who themselves are protected in their home markets, US manufacturers go bankrupt or are forced to outsource to survive (e.g. Boeing's new 7E7 is 52% designed and manufactured by Japan, Italy, and other countries, General Motors routinely uses Honda engines in several lines).

4. US loses its manufacturing base through forced bankruptcies or acquisitions and this increases the dependence on foreign producers.

5. Foreign countries use the American dollars earned from selling us foreign consumer goods to finance our government debt and to buy out our remaining industries.

6. American government becomes so dependent on foreign lenders that it can not object when foreign countries seek to buy out our core companies.

7. American consumers feel no effects in the short-term because foreign purchases of US Treasury bonds keeps interest rates low and the money supply high.

Becoming Extremely Vulnerable

As our industrial base declines we are forced to import more, produce less, and incur greater debt. All of this while trying to fight two far flung wars and the internal terrorist war. **We are facing a very uncertain and dangerous future.**

We need our leaders to immediately recognize the true state of our dependence on foreign money and foreign goods. We are fast losing our ability to take corrective action by failing to admit that there is a problem. **Please write your congressman and the President your thoughts and suggestions.**

ECONOMY IN CRISIS

CREATING AWARENESS OF OUR TRUE ECONOMIC CONDITION


Learn more at www.EconomyInCrisis.org

Contents

November 7, 2005

Vol. 4, No. 21

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE



[COVER]

Superpower Showdown

BY JAMES P. PINKERTON America needs a new strategy for dealing with China, a country we can't contain and can't afford to fight. **Page 7**

[MIDEAST]

Bad For You Too?

BY LEON HADAR Israel expected the Iraq War to disarm one enemy. Instead it has created others. **Page 15**

[IDEAS]

How I Became A Conservative

BY ROGER SCRUTON During the Paris unrest of '68, a young man discovers himself—and Edmund Burke—on the other side of the barricades. **Page 23**

COLUMNS

6 Patrick J. Buchanan: The Battle for Trafalgar Square

35 Taki: Duff Cooper in love and war

NEWS & VIEWS

4 Fourteen Days: O'Connor's Successor; Bush's First Veto: Torture Restrictions; Boy Meets Girl Meets Girl

17 Deep Background: Yelling Terrorism in a Crowded Subway; Syria's Reprieve

ARTICLES

19 W. James Antle III: Open-borders advocates hide their true colors.

21 Justin Raimondo: Judith Miller didn't go to jail on principle but to protect Chalabi.

ARTS & LETTERS

28 Steve Sailer: Charlize Theron in "North Country"

29 Mary Eberstadt: *Between Two Worlds: The Inner Lives of Children of Divorce* by Elizabeth Marquardt

31 R.J. Stove: *The Awful End of Prince William the Silent: The First Assassination of a Head of State With a Handgun* by Lisa Jardine

33 Clark Stooksbury: *Lion of Hollywood: The Life and Legend of Louis B. Mayer* by Scott Eyman

COVER PHOTO: EYEPRESS. COVER DESIGN: MARK GRAEF

[JUSTICE]


ROE REPUBLICANS

The nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court has elicited some long overdue establishment conservative skepticism about President Bush's judgment. Perhaps some reliably Republican commentators have finally learned that it doesn't pay to follow whenever this president says, "trust me."

"Trust me" is essentially Bush's conservative case for Miers. He knows her heart, a not especially subtle signal to the Religious Right that Miers is an evangelical and therefore someone they can count on as a reliable vote. Unfortunately, no theological injunctions provide guidance on *stare decisis*. Miers has no relevant background in constitutional law and no track record on the major legal issues of our time. She is a blank slate whose judicial philosophy, if it even exists, is unknown to her closest friends and colleagues. Administration spokesmen are making the rounds on the talk shows claiming that Miers is a committed originalist. Given the history of past Republican appointments to the Supreme Court, such assurances are simply not good enough.

Dwight Eisenhower named Earl Warren and William Brennan, both architects of modern liberal jurisprudence. Richard Nixon's nominations included Lewis Powell, the court's savior of affirmative action, and Harry Blackmun, its guarantor of legal abortion. John Paul Stevens, the leader of the court's liberal bloc, was given his lifetime appointment by Gerald Ford. George H.W. Bush famously nominated David Souter. Even Ronald Reagan gave us the disappointing Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy. Miers, an outsider with no paper trail, fits this profile.

Republican presidents appointed seven of the nine sitting justices, yet there are only two sure votes against *Roe v. Wade*—a figure that does not



include John Roberts, whose credentials as a strict constructionist far exceed those of Miers. It's difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is some Rovian calculation going on here: keep the social conservatives chasing after an anti-*Roe* majority so they will be motivated to turn out on Election Day. Nominate enough Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomases to make their support for the GOP seem plausible. Yet be careful not to go too far because if *Roe* is ever overturned, the values voters may stay home. In this context, Miers deserves real scrutiny. Conservatives shouldn't bet the Supreme Court on Bush's word alone.

[STRATEGY]

WE'LL HOLD YOUR COAT

You may have thought that official Washington was looking for an exit strategy from its Iraq venture, but if little buddy Israel has anything to say about it, Iraq is only the first Mideast war we're supposed to fight. Last month a delegation of Israeli bigwigs led by Yuval Steinitz, chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs Committee, made the rounds in Washington, telling lawmakers and officials that "Israel will not live under the threat of an Iranian

nuclear bomb." The group professed (of course) to see "similarities to what happened in the 1930s" and said that if the United States refused to act, Israel would act alone—though of course that was the "worst possible scenario."

We can appreciate that Israel would like to remain the only nuclear-armed country in the Middle East, just as the United States fully enjoyed the nuclear monopoly it held briefly after World War II. But there is no such thing as absolute "existential" security in the modern world. The United States doesn't have it, nor England, France, Russia, or China, nor India or Pakistan. Israel may have to learn to be, in this regard, a nation like all the others. We have no doubt it will succeed if it has to.

Moreover, this probably isn't the best time to goad the United States into starting another war. People who consider themselves good friends of Israel touted the Iraq venture as a cakewalk, saying we'd be welcomed with flowers. It hasn't worked out that way. To be blunt, it is not in America's interest to start a war with Iran over a nuclear capacity Tehran may or may not have 10 years down the road. We would in the short term make ourselves much more vulner-

able to terrorism and multiply the number of committed enemies we have in the Mideast and the world. There is no assurance we could eliminate Iran's nuclear programs with bombing.

If Israel wants to start a war against Iran, it is free to do so. The consequences would, as Israelis themselves point out, not be pretty. But we hope that some American officials had the gumption to tell their Israeli guests that fighting Israel's wars for it is not what America is all about.

[ECONOMICS]

LET'S OUTSOURCE MIERS

First outsourcing came for the call-center workers, then the software engineers. Now, lest any profession seem immune, even lawyers are losing their jobs to India. Patent registration, contract vetting, and a number of other legal services can be done on the cheap in Mumbai. "The people to whom you are outsourcing are well-educated and can work at an hourly rate that is 10% of what large-firm lawyers charge," a spokesman for one marketing firm told the *Wall Street Journal*. Law schools on the subcontinent graduate some 200,000 attorneys every year.

Readers can be forgiven for thinking this country could stand to lose a few hundred thousand lawyers. Unfortunately, the upshot of outsourcing legal work is not likely to be a less litigious society. As the *Journal* story noted, "it could even encourage companies and individuals to become more litigious by lowering the costs of filing lawsuits." Fewer jobs, more lawsuits—brought to you by the global economy.

[POLITICS]

BUSH'S TORTURED PR

In a welcome display of Republican independence, the Senate voted 90 to 9 to create interrogation standards for military personnel in order to ensure

the humane treatment of detainees in U.S. custody. Such GOP hawks as Sen. John McCain—who has experienced the brutality of wartime torture firsthand—understand the overriding importance to our armed forces of expunging the stain of Abu Ghraib even if some in the administration consider it a lower priority.

This apparently includes the president himself, whose spokesmen say he will veto the entire defense appropriations bill if the interrogation rules aren't dropped. President Bush has threatened vetoes before—last year's gargantuan farm-subsidies bill and this year's pork-laden transportation appropriation—but his pen has conveniently gone missing each time. Now he might hold up \$442 billion in defense spending, including pay and benefits for soldiers as well as funding for Iraq and Afghanistan, to forestall regulations designed to prevent torture. Karl Rove really must be preoccupied.

[CULTURE]

DUTCH TREATS

Holland was among the first countries to give full marriage rights to gays. No reactionary notions about marriage between one man and one woman for the Dutch. Last month Victor de Bruijn drew the logical conclusion and registered a civil union with two women. "I love both Bianca and Mirjam, so I am marrying them both," he said. Polygamous marriage is not yet possible in the Netherlands (just wait), but a civil union is. "We went to the notary in our marriage costume and exchanged rings. We consider this to be just an ordinary marriage."

Of course, changing the traditional definition of marriage to include gay marriage couldn't possibly lead to a general free for all, could it now? Well, in Holland it already has. Look for a "married" threesome (or whatever) to come soon to a jurisdiction near you. ■

The American Conservative

Founding Editor
Taki Theodoracopoulos

Editor and Publisher
Scott McConnell

Executive Editor
Kara Hopkins

Assistant Editors
W. James Antle III
Daniel McCarthy

Film Critic
Steve Sailer

Contributing Editors
Andrew J. Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Richard Cummings,
Michael Desch, Philip Giralddi, Paul Gottfried,
Leon Hadar, Peter Hitchens, Christopher Layne,
Eric S. Margolis, James P. Pinkerton, Justin Raimondo,
Fred Reed, R.J. Stove, Thomas E. Woods Jr., John Zmirak

Art Director
Mark Graef

Publishing Consultant
Ronald E. Burr

Office Manager
Veronica Yanos

Copy Assistant
John W. Greene

Editor Emeritus
Patrick J. Buchanan

The American Conservative, Vol. 4, No. 21, November 7, 2005 (ISSN 1540-966X). Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. TAC is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA, 22209. Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. Printed in the United States of America. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$69.97 other foreign (U.S. funds). Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds).

For subscription orders, payments, and other subscription inquiries—

By phone: **800-579-6148**
(outside the U.S./Canada 856-488-5321)

Via Web: www.amconmag.com

By mail: *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030

When ordering a subscription please allow 4–6 weeks for delivery of your first issue and all subscription transactions.

Inquiries and letters to the editor should be sent to letters@amconmag.com. For advertising sales or editorial call 703-875-7600.

This issue went to press on October 13, 2005.
Copyright 2005 *The American Conservative*.

Burn What You Worshipped

“Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been reported to the Right Hon. Lord Viscount Nelson, KB and commander in chief, he then died of his wound.”

So reads the simple entry in the log of HMS Victory for Oct. 21, 1805, the day of Trafalgar, one of the greatest sea battles of history, in which Admiral Horatio Nelson, architect of the Royal Navy victory over the French and Spanish fleets, lost his life.

On this month's 200th anniversary of that battle that ended Napoleon's threat of invasion, a battle is being fought over London's Trafalgar Square, where a 185-foot victory column stands, atop which is a statue of the great Sea Lord who had led British fleets to triumph at Copenhagen and the Battle of the Nile.

London Mayor Ken Livingstone, dubbed “Red Ken” by the press for his hard-left views, wants to plant, in the heart of Trafalgar Square, a 9-foot statue of another Nelson—Nelson Mandela.

The Westminster Council vehemently objects. They say the Mandela statue, which shows him in a loose-fitting shirt, hands uplifted as though in animated conversation, should be placed in front of the South African embassy.

Paul Drury, a consultant for the conservation group English Heritage, argues that putting an “informal, small-scale statue” of Mandela alongside the warrior heroes whose statues now stand there “would be a major and awkward change in the narrative of the square.”

To which Livingstone snaps, “I have not a clue who two of the generals there are or what they did.”

Those two generals are Sir Charles James Napier and Sir Henry Havelock. Napier besieged and captured Sindh,

sending back the famous one-word Latin message: *Peccavi*. “I have sinned.” Havelock led the suppression of the Indian Mutiny of 1857. Both military heroes helped secure the crown jewel of the British Empire for the future empress of India, Victoria.

One imagines Red Ken knows exactly who they are and what they did, and this is why he wants them out of Trafalgar Square—and his hero Mandela, the former ANC train-bomber who spent 27 years in prison and emerged to become president of South Africa, in.

Red Ken is not an empire man. But Trafalgar Square is the grand plaza that honors British military heroes. And as Mandela is neither British nor a military hero, what would he be doing in Trafalgar Square? His statue no more belongs there than on the Washington Mall.

But Livingstone and Rev. Jesse Jackson, who has entered the fray in support of the Mandela statue, “to bring this internationally important public space into the 21st century,” are after other game.

That is to rub the noses of the British in the reality that their empire is dead and gone and the heroes they were raised to revere are to be displaced by the gods of globalism. Hereafter, instead of statues of European conquerors gracing the capitals of the Asian and African colonies they subdued, the statues of Third World rulers will rise in the capitals of the old mother countries.

“Burn what you worshipped, worship what you burned!” Clovis was told by the bishop as he led his armies to be baptized,

when pagan Europe converted to Christianity. That is what this is all about—the transition to a new dispensation.

“[I]t is what he represents they don't want to see depicted,” says Livingstone, “because in that square, one Nelson signifies the birth of the British Empire and 100 years of global dominance. ... Nelson Mandela would signify the peaceful transition to a multiracial and multicultural world, and I would be proud to have that in London.”

But whose square is it, anyway? Red Ken's or the people's square? Whom do the British people wish to honor?

Who we honor tells us who we are. The Battle of Trafalgar Square is a battle Red Ken instinctively understands, but many of his countrymen do not. For it is about what Thomas Sowell calls “visions in conflict.”

Red Ken wants Mandela's statue to celebrate the end of an era and coming of a new world where London is no longer the capital of a mighty empire upon which the sun never sets but rather has become a polyglot cosmopolitan city where everyone's heroes can be equally honored and any idea that the British are or were a superior people, culture, or civilization has become repellent.

In this new age, the West's assigned role is to repent endlessly of its shameful centuries of racism, imperialism, and colonialism.

“If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—forever,” O'Brien told Winston in 1984. In the hard Left's picture of the future, Western man endlessly does penance and pays tribute for the sins of his fathers. That is what Nelson v. Nelson in Trafalgar Square is all about. ■

[happy third]

Superpower Showdown

America needs a new strategy for dealing with China, a country we can't contain and can't afford to fight

By James P. Pinkerton

THE HISTORY of the United States is the history of confrontation, even conflict, with the other great powers of the earth.

At the dawn of the 19th century, the young Republic found itself confronted with the two great powers of that world, Britain and France. We fought them both. Everyone knows about the War of 1812, but perhaps we've forgotten the quasi-war with France from 1798 to 1800; during those years the U.S. Navy seized some 80 French vessels.

By the beginning of the 20th century, America had made its peace with Britain and France—although many in London, as late as the 1860s, would have been delighted to see Washington lose the Civil War—but the U.S. soon found itself in wars hot and cold, against Germany, then Japan, then Russia.

Now, in the 21st century, the looming great powers are China and India. So if history is our guide—and it should be—we can expect forthcoming collisions with those countries as well. Of course, most Americans today are preoccupied with the Muslim Middle East, but our fight with Islam does not alter the challenges posed by the “twin pillars” of Asia—nations that might well possess economic outputs equivalent or even superior to the U.S. by mid-century. Yet at the same time, those two pillars will no doubt contend with each other, as

well as with secondary nuclear powers such as Pakistan.

So America's grand strategy for the next century should be twofold. First, we must recognize that rising powers inherently bring rising threats. Second, such rising powers should be balanced, played off each other, and not directly confronted. Why? Because the cost of American participation in nuclear-era world war, for any reason less than national survival, is simply too great. America would be wise to accept a reduced role in Asia in exchange for a reduced responsibility for participating in the inevitable future regional conflicts.

We should remember the Latin term *tertium gaudens*—the happy third. That is, there's no law saying we have to be in the middle of every fight; it's better sometimes to hold the coats of those who do. Yet our current policy presumes that we should be involved in all potential combats—although, for America's national interest, a better Asia would be one in which China, India, Japan, and possibly another “tiger” or two contend with each other for power while we enjoy the happy luxury of third-party by-standing.

Today, U.S. policy has put the nation in perilously close proximity to two separate flashpoints with China: North Korea and Taiwan. And China is surely

the angriest rising power in Asia today; Americans should understand that if we want a war with the People's Republic, Beijing will happily give us one. Yet if we continue to drain away resources fighting in the Middle East—thus revealing our overall weaknesses, as well as our military tactics—it is no sure bet that we will win. For all the errors China has made, it wouldn't have earned its status as the oldest continuous civilization on earth unless it had been able to learn from its mistakes.

The U.S., by contrast, acts more like a teenager, convinced of its own immortality—although in this particular instance, the older China is not necessarily wiser. Yes, the Chinese are proud of their ancient and patient civilization; yet at the same time, most observers agree that they burn with resentment over the colonial exploitation they suffered during their long half-millennium slide that began in the 15th century, a slide that reversed itself only in the last three decades. And the U.S.—as the leader against North Korean nukes, as the chief defender of Taiwan, as Japan's best friend in Asia—has now assumed the role of “heavy” in the minds of the Chinese, a role held formerly by the British and other colonizers.

Meanwhile, it's understandable that Americans, sitting on top of the world

but nevertheless feeling insecure, would resent the Chinese for resenting them. And in the game of world politics, resentment is a prelude to war plans, and war plans are often a prelude to war.

Indeed, the Asia war drums are thumping in the U.S. even as we have our hands full with Iraq and perhaps Iran. The Clinton administration once labeled China a “strategic partner”—a label that in retrospect seems naïve—but the Bush administration has called China a “strategic competitor.” Is it really wise to get into such a diplomatic name game? Is it smart geopolitics to downgrade a country publicly from friend to foe? Surely it would be better just to say, simply, that China is a large and powerful country across the Pacific.

Beginning with the Hainan Island plane-crash incident in 2001, radical American neoconservatives have made common cause with more conventional militarists, agreeing that China is to be seen as an enemy. And the day after 9/11, Bill Bennett told CNN that the U.S. was in “a struggle between good and evil,”

against China. The goal, he crowed, waving the reddest possible flag, was to “Taiwanize” the People’s Republic. Some might be tempted to minimize the political weight of a mere scribbler, but after Operation Iraqi Freedom, is there any doubt that noisy neocons have the capacity to translate their warlike op-eds into war itself?

In fact, planning for a war with China—based on the feeling that it’s inevitable anyway, so why not make sure we win?—has continued moving forward, like so much mission-creeping kudzu. But few were noticing such behind-the-scenes scheming until Sept. 8, when the sober-minded *Wall Street Journal* ran a front-page article hotly headlined “Secret Weapon: Inside Pentagon, A Scholar Shapes Views of China. Beijing, Mr. Pillsbury Says, Sees U.S. as Military Foe; An Optimist Turns Gloomy.” Americans were hardly through subduing Fallujah for the third or fourth time when they were hit full in the face with the prospect of a war a thousand times bigger.

nese officials have threatened to use nuclear weapons against the U.S. over the years: in July, Gen. Zhu Chenghu, dean of China’s National Defense University, told the *Financial Times* and other media outlets that if Uncle Sam interferes with China over Taiwan, “Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese.”

By the same token, there has never been a shortage of Americans who have threatened to nuke China. That’s the point: as in centuries past, great powers threaten each other, and often such threats and counter-threats escalate into war.

Plenty of Americans, to be sure, have spoken out against such escalation, including some hawks. Ralph Peters, a retired U.S. Army colonel, has been a strong supporter of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and his larger worldview is revealed by title of his new book, *New Glory: Expanding America’s Global Supremacy*. Yet even Peters is reluctant to get into a trans-Pacific world war: “While we must always be prepared for a conflict with China, we should stop looking for one.”

Meanwhile, the U.S. conducts war simulations against China on a constant basis, and the Chinese seem to be doing the same thing against us. In recent years, their spies and agents have penetrated not only the FBI but also the military-industrial complex—even enjoying “coffee” at the Clinton White House that seemed to coincide with the passing of American missile secrets to Beijing. Currently the Chinese are launching near-constant hack attacks against U.S. computers; we recently learned that cyber-snoops at Shandong University had decrypted Secure Hash Algorithm-1, one of the basic codes of the U.S. military.

So the bleak logic of ineluctable conflict has us all in its thrall. As an American might say of this coming war conun-

THE U.S. CONDUCTS WAR SIMULATIONS AGAINST CHINA, AND THE CHINESE SEEM TO BE DOING THE SAME AGAINST US. IN RECENT YEARS, THEIR SPIES AND AGENTS HAVE PENETRATED NOT ONLY THE FBI BUT ALSO THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

listing Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and China as evildoers worthy of attack. China? Is Osama bin Laden on some Long March of his own? Are Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction cached in the Forbidden City?

In the years since, the neocons have gotten themselves right where they want to be: tangled up in the Middle East. Yet some seem eager to open up a “second front”; the ever-belligerent Max Boot, for example, agitated in the pages of—where else?—*The Weekly Standard* for a policy of “internal subversion”

The “Mr. Pillsbury” in the headline is Michael Pillsbury, a Sinophile turned Sinophobe. He told the *Journal* that China “may become the largest challenge in our nation’s history.” Wow. Bigger than the challenge we faced in 1776? 1861? 1941? 1962? Pillsbury was adamant: “Beijing sees the U.S. as an inevitable foe, and is planning accordingly.”

And of course, who’s to say Pillsbury is wrong? In June, a defecting Chinese diplomat told the *Washington Times* that Beijing sees America as the “largest enemy, the major strategic rival.” Chi-

drum, “We have a wolf by the ears”; that is, we can’t keep doing what we’re doing, but we can’t let go, either. The Chinese have a similar phrase, *Qi hu nan xia*—“riding the tiger and can’t get off.” Moreover, the current cycle of one-upsmanship, on our side of the Pacific, is seen as a matter of honor or credibility. For the Chinese, it’s all about *bao quan mian zi*—keeping face.

Recently, the September-October issue of *Foreign Affairs* brimmed with articles further attesting to a Barbara Tuchman-like inevitability of Sino-U.S. conflict. One need only read between the lines of these articles, written for an elite foreign-policy audience, to hear the future Guns of August. For example, David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, of Hong Kong University, describe China’s “global hunt for energy,” which puts the U.S. and China in direct competition for the same oil supplies. As the writers observe, “Given the White House’s current penchant for unilateral intervention and the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might reasonably begin to fear that the United States will try to block its purchases of natural resources to destabilize it.” And many Americans seem to agree; an energy specialist at the University of California is quoted as saying that he failed to see any scenario that would not lead to confrontation between the United States and China over energy.

In another article in the same issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Affairs in Singapore, observes, “The conviction is growing among Chinese policymakers that the United States is bent on curtailing China’s rise.” Mahbubani recalls an incident that most Americans probably never even knew about, the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. American officials dismissed it as a mistake, and yet many Chinese, reports Mahbubani,

“remain convinced that the bombing was deliberate.” Is that genuine paranoia on the part of the People’s Republic? Or are Beijing propagandists deliberately whipping up anti-American fervor? Mahbubani, speaking for himself, lends a third-party credence to Chinese fears: “The United States is doing more to destabilize China than any other

good-hearted-wonks-gathered-together concept, which even onetime Clinton supporter Michael Mandelbaum derided as “foreign policy as social work.” Moreover, the basic idea of U.S. diplomats plodding their way through interminable multilateral meetings seemed out of keeping with our status as the “Unipower.” No wonder Americans lost

VOTERS REJECTED BUSH’S VISION OF A NEW WORLD ORDER, WITH ITS SCARY BLACK HELICOPTER OVERTONES, AND THEY NEVER MUCH LIKED BILL CLINTON’S GOOD-HEARTED-WONKS-GATHERED-TOGETHER CONCEPT.

power,” he avers, adding with a tone of regret, “No one in Washington seems to be proposing, much less pursuing, a comprehensive new strategy for U.S.-China relations.”

So the time has come for a different strategy that is neither hawkish nor dovish—merely realistic. It’s a foreign-policy approach that’s been proven in the past, in the historical crucible of great-power jockeying.

Other than isolationism, the U.S. has generally adopted three foreign-policy strategies over the last two centuries: collective security, containment, and war. All have met with success—and failure.

The first strategy, collective security, was endorsed by Woodrow Wilson during World War I, but the 28th president could never sell the realization of that strategy, the League of Nations, to either senators or citizenry. In recent times, George H.W. Bush revived the idea. And in fact, joint military action worked well enough in Kuwait and later in the Balkans, but once again, Americans never cottoned to the collective-security concept. Voters rejected Bush’s vision of a New World Order, with its scary black helicopter overtones, and they never much liked Bill Clinton’s

patience with joint efforts in regard to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.

The second foreign-policy model has been containment. Back in 1807, President Thomas Jefferson imposed the Embargo Act on the 17-state Republic, through which he attempted, by banning European commerce, to contain Europe economically. The embargo, which crashed American prosperity, proved a disaster for the new nation.

Since then, the U.S. has attempted various embargoes and containments. The one spectacular success was the four-decade effort against the Soviet Union—although other factors, of course, were at work as well. But a more typical result of containment as an overall policy has been the American experience with Cuba—which is, to be sure, a deep disappointment.

As for America’s dual containment policy toward Iraq and Iran, pursued over the last two decades, it, too, has been a failure. We regime-changed Iraq anyway, and the Iranians are becoming more hostile and perhaps more nuclear with each passing year.

The third foreign-policy model has been war, or the threat of war. For most of U.S. history—from the myriad Indian

wars to Afghanistan in 2001—the U.S. has been able simply to vanquish its enemies. Out of this winning streak has come the feeling that the U.S. is supreme.

In 1992, Paul Wolfowitz, then under-secretary of defense, produced a document declaring that the goal of American foreign policy in the post-Soviet era was to maintain an overwhelming global dominance to prevent “potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” Indeed, Wolfowitz declared, the crushing of any possible rival must be the “dominant consideration,” as the U.S. strives “to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would ... be sufficient to generate global power.”

This ambitious document was ahead of its time in 1992, and it was soon withdrawn from public discussion. But a decade later, Wolfowitz, by now promoted to deputy secretary of defense, oversaw the drafting of a similar docu-

The further gist of what might be called the Wolfowitz Doctrine is that the Pentagon would enforce this American order. If this was the Unipolar Moment, as Charles Krauthammer dubbed it, neocons in high places saw their chance to make the most of it: “The United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe”; other countries, the document continues, should not even dream of competing with the U.S. military. Instead, nations of the world should sit back as Uncle Sam problem-solves. Yet one obvious reality seems never to have occurred to the doctrine-drafters: if America presumes hegemony over all, it risks becoming the enemy of all.

This Wolfowitz Doctrine—U.S. supremacy ballooned by world-ahistorical optimism about what the 82nd Airborne could achieve—has been met by what might be called the Wellington Reality. As the Iron Duke sagely observed, for a great power, there is no such thing as a

done. The rest of the world—ROW in Pentagon parlance—has been divided into five regional commands: Europe and Africa are one command; the Middle East is a second; North and South America are the third and fourth.

Oh yes, Asia and the Pacific, that’s the fifth command, abbreviated as PACOM. And these demarcations are no secret; all dwellers of the planet—including those in the People’s Republic of China, all 1.3 billion of them—can visit the Pentagon’s website if they are curious to see where they fit into our world-bestridding scheme.

For those few Americans who pay attention to such military matters, the blithe presumption is that this is the way it always will be; the U.S. command system represents the sweep of America’s seemingly permanent ambition. Just as once upon a time the Romans couldn’t imagine a world without their running it—the Mediterranean was simply called *Mare Nostrum*, our sea—so today Americans across the ideological spectrum assume that every element of life around the world needs our supervision, now and forever. Those living in Washington hear plenty of casual conversations with military personnel who have just returned from some exercise or war game—simulations in which American forces have defended or liberated just about every gulf, strait, and cape in the world. Why? Because all are deemed vital to our national security.


From George Soros on the Left to Bill Clinton in the center to George W. Bush on the Right, it is a given that the U.S. will administer more than six billion people—their politics, their trade zones, their human-rights practices, their baby-whale protections. How could this not be? After all, in the grandiose formulation of Clinton’s secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, the U.S. is the “indispensable nation.” And Bush has

WITH FUKUYAMA-ESQUE ASSURANCE, EVEN ARROGANCE, **WOLFOWITZ ARGUED THAT HISTORY HAD, IN FACT, ENDED, AND THAT THE WORLD WAS LEFT WITH “A SINGLE SUSTAINABLE MODEL FOR NATIONAL SUCCESS: FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE ENTERPRISE.” IN OTHER WORDS, THE AMERICAN WAY.**

ment. That opus, signed by President George W. Bush on September 17, 2002, will be remembered by many as a classic bit of solipsistic chest-beating, performed on the planetary proscenium before a bemused world-audience. With Fukuyama-esque assurance, even arrogance, Wolfowitz argued that history had, in fact, ended, and that the world was left with “a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” In other words, the American Way.

small war. And this Wellington Reality, when applied to our time, means that to most nations, the mere presence of U.S. troops is a red flag.

It is remarkable how deeply our hegemonic ambition has been embedded into our routine thinking—so deeply that a historically abnormal circumstance is made to seem surreally normal. It just isn’t normal, for example, to include other people’s countries within one’s own military-administrative commands. But that’s exactly what the Pentagon has



But Moscow and Beijing staged a substantial joint air-land-sea exercise in August. Drawing upon their shared Orwellian war-is-peace newspeak tradition, the two powers named their war game Peace Mission 2005. But as Jin Canrong, professor of international relations at the People's University of China, told Al-Jazeera, "The main target is the United States."

So what sort of war might the Chinese be preparing for? *The Atlantic Monthly's* Robert Kaplan seems confident that China is planning on building a huge navy—

been even more emphatic about America's manifest destiny to make this the "liberty century."

Yet we have, to put it mildly, suffered some disappointments. Not only is the world not happy with the Bush Doctrine, but Americans don't seem to be so fond of it either. Edward Luttwak, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has offered one useful piece of explanatory context. Eleven years ago, Luttwak prophesied that America would become "post-heroic." That is, as a nation of small families, we would no longer be willing to spare any of our relatively scarce children for the purpose of war. And falling Iraq War approval poll numbers, as well as falling enlistment rates, are already revealing the impact of this casualty-averse demography.

The profound effects of this Luttwakian reality have not yet fully registered on Washington. The U.S. population is becoming post-heroic, and yet U.S. policy remains heroic, pursuing its planetary ambitions. As evidence of this globe-glomming, we might consider our attempted encirclement of China, requiring the establishment of bases from "the

Stans" to South Korea to Japan. We have military advisers operating in Mongolia; the U.S. Navy has even sent its ships calling on Vietnam, as admirals make no secret of their desire for a base in the one foreign country that defeated us in war. And of course, looming huge in the Pacific is America's "special relationship" with Taiwan. It would indeed be unfortunate if all these hyper-extended commitments led the U.S. into a war that Americans didn't want to fight.

Meanwhile, the Chinese have rallied states the U.S. deems pariahs, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, into a motley but resource-rich crew of anti-Americanism. Moreover, in June 2001, China spearheaded into being the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comprising six members: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Since then, the SCO has expanded: India, Pakistan, and Iran now enjoy "observer" status. It remains to be seen, of course, whether this ambitious new Eurasian entity possesses much weight; so far, America and its allies have ignored the SCO's resolution that we quit Afghanistan.

which, as he argued in a June 2005 cover story entitled "How We Would Fight China," our Navy would promptly sink in battle. But might the Chinese have a plan up their sleeve that we don't know about? Might all of China's engineers and scientists, many of them moving in and out of the U.S., come up with some wonder weapon? Kaplan may be content to spin for a well-funded U.S. Navy, which perpetually dreams of neo-Nelsonian blue-water combat, but the Chinese might not be as clueless as we wish them to be.

In August, *Time* reported on a wave of cyber-attacks against U.S. government computers, emanating from China, which the Pentagon dubbed Titan Rain. Said one U.S. defense contractor, "This has been going on so long and it's so well organized that the whole thing is state sponsored, I think." But what do all these hack attacks foretell? Current levels of cyber-intruding are categorized as akin to espionage; they are viewed as annoying but tolerable. But what would happen if the Chinese succeeded at, say, disabling our GPS system? Or if they managed to delete the files of NORAD?

Or, more ominously, in the spirit of *wei ch'i*, their national game—known to us as Go—if they were to take advantage of our near-open borders to pre-position assets, including possibly nuclear weapons, inside the U.S.?

So what's the solution? Two separate camps have their answers, and they dominate the China policy discussion. The first camp is noisy, explicit, and bel-

retreat or else become democratically transformed.

But the Chinese might see the situation differently. A cliché of the era is that China is analogous to Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany, a rising power looking for its "place in the sun." If so, then it's a question of how the Chinese will be restrained. In the case of Germany, a grand coalition of France, Britain, Russia,

and political power give[s] a nation no commercial advantage." Indeed, Angell concluded, "It is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjugating another."

In many ways, of course, he was right: it didn't make economic sense for countries to go to war against each other. Nevertheless, they did go to war. The Angellists failed to understand that countries fight over perceptions of slight, as well as regard for status. For all the alleged hardnosedness involved in planning for war, actually going to war is rarely a rational decision.

Still, the commerce-determinist dream dies hard; neo-Angellists are once again in high places. *The New York Times'* Thomas Friedman ranks as the most prominent neo-Angellist today. In his 1999 *Lexus and the Olive Tree*, he put forth his "Golden Arches" test—a test that was immediately flunked. Friedman's self-proclaimed insight was that "no two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's." Yet in that same year, NATO went to war against Serbia, and during the fighting, McDonald's franchises in Belgrade were severely vandalized. So much for the idea that economics drowns ideology, or nationalism, in the sugary syrup of prosperity.

One reason that the Montesquieu/Angell/Friedman view lives on is that it tells a sizable and powerful constituency what it wants to hear. That is, "neo-Angellist" businesspeople want to believe that what they are doing is good for the world, and failing that, they at least want others to believe that what they are doing is good for the world. And so they summon up a sizable cadre of libertarian and globalist apologists to proclaim that they are making sweet commerce indeed.

Yet there are three worms in the neo-Angellist apple.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE UNITED STATES COULD EVER ASSEMBLE AN EQUIVALENTLY LARGE COALITION TO RESTRAIN CHINA.

ligerent. The second is quiet, implicit, and ultimately pacifistic. Yet neither can truly succeed, because the first camp would fight a disastrous war with China, while the second would lose its D.C. policy struggle to the first camp—which then would go back to fighting its disastrous war with China.

The first camp might be called the nationalists-militarists. This group includes the neoconservatives, but it also attracts figures from a substantially older tradition, the "Asia First" faction that reaches back deep into the Republican Party in particular, from Sen. Albert Beveridge at the beginning of the last century through Gen. Douglas MacArthur in the middle of the 20th century to Defense Department guru Michael Pillsbury today. And this group is reinforced by various constituencies, including the Taiwan Lobby, advocates for Tibet, the Falun Gong, and the "house church" Christians.

It is hard to imagine that most of these people think that war with China is a good idea. But having stoked themselves up on soaringly millennialist Gersonian rhetoric, they are having a hard time finding a way to back down. They must cling to the hope that China will shrink from collision with the morally clear United States—that it will either

and the United States was required—twice—to bring Berlin to heel. It remains to be seen whether the United States could ever assemble an equivalently large coalition to restrain China.

The second camp draws inspiration from Montesquieu, who held that *doux commerce*—sweet commerce—would inevitably soften social relations. Montesquieu was right about *intranational* issues, noting the sweetening effects, in his day, of embourgeoisment. But *international* issues proved to be a different story; as nations became wealthier, they avidly spent much of their economic surplus on wickedly effective new weapons. Nothing *doux* about that.

In the 20th century, the greatest updater of Montesquieu's views was Sir Norman Angell, whose 1910 book, *The Great Illusion*, boldly declared that war was obsolete. "The warlike nations do not inherit the earth," he maintained. "They represent the decaying human element." Angell's argument—that nations connected to each other by market economics have no choice but to co-operate with each other on politics—struck a resounding international chord. His book was translated into 25 languages, selling more than two million copies. It even gave rise to "Angellism," a body of thought holding that "military

The first worm is outsourcing, which for most American firms is still the most honeyed part of the U.S.-China relationship. But outsourcing has its problems. For one thing, it creates a substantial backlash in the U.S., as workers understandably fear losing their jobs. And the trend is hardly decreasing. As one executive of a large American multinational company—once a prominent manufacturer in the U.S., now almost entirely making its products overseas—said to me recently, “You show me a company that doesn’t do its manufacturing in China, and I’ll show you a company that can be beaten, competitively.”

Moreover, this outsourcing worm jeopardizes our national security; a totally post-industrial America would be unable to produce the necessary implements of war, should they be needed. Indeed, the Pentagon is struggling to maintain some sort of domestic industrial base for the U.S. Michael Boskin, chairman of President George H.W.

tute economist Irwin Stelzer, who, writing in the Sept. 5 *Weekly Standard* wondered: Is it really the case that “rigid adherence to free trade serves our geopolitical interests”?

Looking back a century, both Lynn and Stelzer might have cited the British Conservative politician Leo Amery, who had regularly argued against Angell, as well as other dogmatic globalists. Amery warned that Germany’s mercantilist neighbor-beggar economic strategy, the opposite of Britain’s Angellist approach, was giving the Kaiser a dangerous war-production advantage. “The successful powers will be those who have the greatest industrial base,” Amery prophesied, adding that those holding “the industrial power and the power of invention and science will be able to defeat all others.” As Winston Churchill, whom Amery served in Britain’s World War II cabinet, once observed, a country engaged in war needs the tools to finish the job.

summer, all the lobbyists on K Street could not tamp down the wildfire of anti-Chinese feeling that erupted over the failed bid by the China National Overseas Oil Company to buy the U.S. oil company Unocal. The House voted 398 to 15 to block the possible deal, which soon fell through.

The reaction in China was vehement. The headline in the July 6 edition of the government-run *China Daily* declared, “U.S. lawmakers meddle in CNOOC’s Unocal bid.” And while in America the squall of anti-CNOOC feeling passed quickly enough, in China the memory seems to be lasting longer; the chief financial officer of CNOOC, Yang Hua, told the *Financial Times* on Sept. 17 that the Chinese have their own definition of human rights, and it starts with oil. “What is ‘human rights’?” Yang asked rhetorically. “I’ll tell you what it means. It means having guaranteed access to energy.” Many Americans would disagree, but again, that’s the point: if we see things one way, and the Chinese see things another way—and if the stakes are high enough—that’s the way to war.

In other words, when it’s a question of fighting “evil,” the sweetest fruits of commerce taste bitter. As Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said in September, America today, in a time of peace and unprecedented trans-Pacific trade, is “a cauldron of anxiety” about China. If issues of status and primacy are at stake, it seems as though lizard brains take over, diminishing rational thinking—as nationalism, xenophobia, and more primitive reflexes rise up in a sanguinary primordialism. The outcome is predictable: as with Angell 90 years ago, the neo-Angells will be overwhelmed yet again.

The third and final worm is that China might be simply unappeasable, no matter what we do. A country that has a 500-year-chip on its shoulder, a government that killed millions in the ‘50s and

IF PRESENT TRENDS CONTINUE, THE CHINESE WILL SOON BE ABLE SIMPLY TO PULL THE PLUG ON OUR ECONOMY—AND SO WE WON’T BE ABLE TO FIGHT.

Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, once reportedly declared, “It doesn’t make any difference whether a country makes potato chips or computer chips,” and yet others, at least, know otherwise: all chips are not created equal. Barry Lynn, in his new book, *End of the Line: The Rise and Coming Fall of the Global Corporation*, argues that if present trends continue, the Chinese will soon be able simply to pull the plug on our economy—and so we won’t be able to fight China even if we want to, or have to, which might make war all the more tempting to the Chinese. If they are sure that they can win easily, why not go for it?

Lynn stands on the Left, and yet he echoes the sentiments of Hudson Insti-

There’s a second worm in Angellism: when free trade is practiced in the face of a perceived military threat, the policy simply implodes. It lacks the necessary popular support. Thus, in regard to contemporary China, an ever-deeper Ricardian economic integration across the Pacific will not prove politically acceptable to hawkishly Beijing-bashing Americans. Yes, many big U.S. companies will happily collaborate with PRC totalitarians; Yahoo!, for example, recently ratted out the privacy of one of its customers to the PRC secret police, and Google Maps has listed Taiwan as a province of the PRC. And yes, most of the Fortune 500 will engage lobbyists to keep the trade routes open to the east. Yet this

'60s and thousands as late as 1989 at Tiananmen Square—this is not necessarily a peace-loving nation; a regime that forces abortions on its populace has not been much sweetened by commerce. Indeed, one could just as easily argue that expanded wealth has given the Chinese expanded geopolitical horizons. Pursuing ever more ambitious world interests—notably oil in the Middle East and in Central Asia, inking deals with Iran and Kazakhstan—China is a country striving for full superpower status. Today, as it extends its power, it is acting increasingly like the U.S.; it has sent peacekeepers and hired guns to such far-flung places as Tajikistan, Sudan, Haiti, and the Panama Canal. As a result, Americans worry that the Middle Kingdom is bent on “Finlandizing” the rest of Asia—although, of course, the Chinese say that the U.S. has already sought to “Americanize” the east.

So what is to be done? Are America's only choices militaristic jingoism or naïve Angellism?

The nationalists-militarists might not actually want a war with China, but they act as if they do, and that's probably enough to persuade the Chinese that a war is coming. And in war planning, as in so many other avenues, if you fake something long enough, you will make it happen.

On the other side of the debate—well, there isn't much of an other side to the debate. The business-minded neo-Angellists may think they are pragmatically managing the U.S.-China relationship, but in truth, they will enjoy that illusion only in the absence of some triggering event. The moment Murphy's Law hits or the instant there's the trans-Pacific equivalent of a Sarajevo assassination of an Austrian archduke, the neo-Angellists will be painted as appeasers by the nationalists-militarists and thus blown to the winds, just as the original Angellists were back in 1914.

But there's a better approach. As Michael Lind of the New America Foundation has advocated, a British-style balance-of-power strategy could forestall a head-to-head collision with China. For centuries, Whitehall juggled European rivals against each other, and it worked well for the Empire. So if the British could play off the likes of the Bourbons, Hapsburgs, Hohenzollerns, and Romanovs, perhaps the U.S. can play off the inevitable rivalry of the Asian powers. It's the good fortune of Americans, after all, that we are unchallenged in our own hemisphere and likely to remain so for a long time to come. And by our further good fortune, three enormous powers—China, India, and Japan—are all next to each other, just like Spain, France, Holland, and Germany in times past.

Although the U.S., as indicated, has generally pursued three basic foreign policy strategies other than isolationism—collective security, containment, and war—we must note that for a relatively brief period, our nation followed a fourth strategy, the power-balancing mode, mostly during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, from 1901-1909. The 26th president is remembered today as something of an imperialist, and he certainly looked upon a weak Latin America with an imperialist's eye. Yet TR gazed at the strong powers across the Atlantic and the Pacific with a sober respect, as well as a strong desire not to see one power gain control of a whole region. Mindful of America's military limitations, Roosevelt sought to defend the national interest by following, in effect, Britain's long-term strategy—that is, keeping the other great powers in relative balance, preventing the emergence of any threatening hegemon.

In 1905, for example, TR mediated the Russo-Japanese war, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. And yet he was

not thinking about the brotherhood of man; rather, he was thinking about the proper correlation of forces in the Pacific.

Perhaps even more significantly, in 1905-6, during the Algeiras crisis in Morocco, when Germany was looking for an excuse to get into a war with France, TR helped settle that dispute, too. He feared that if war erupted, the Germans would crush the French, destroying European equilibrium. And in 1907, he strenuously supported the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague, which aimed at international disarmament. Roosevelt himself was not interested, to be sure, in reducing his arsenal—that same year he sent the Great White Fleet around the world as a show of American strength—but he was happy to see the other countries reduce their arsenals.

Yet in balance-of-power politics, a nation needs allies. In the case of Taiwan, America won't have many allies if it continues to insist that Taiwan is separate and effectively independent of the mainland. The U.S. cannot succeed at balancing power in Asia if Taipei is reflexively regarded as a “must-have” for our side. Even the pro-American Australians have said they won't support Uncle Sam in this instance. Indeed, nobody but the U.S. seems willing to risk a war over the island, and the Chinese have made it clear that over the long run, they will sacrifice just about anything to get Taiwan back.

So barring a general war—which hardly seems like a good idea for the U.S., as well as for China or even for Taiwan—Beijing will eventually recover Taipei, for the simple reason that it's clearly within its sphere of influence. So China will reunify with Taiwan, just as the American North reunified with the South after the Civil War. The federal government in Washington, D.C. would not have not looked kindly on any for-

eign power that sought to assure the secession of Richmond.

So what should the U.S. do? First, we should have an honest debate. Resolved, Americans will not risk mass annihilation in return for Taiwan's independence. Resolved, no more unlimited-liability checks written to the Taiwanese. Using honest realpolitik, the U.S. should tell Taipei that its optimal course is a peaceful Hong Kong/Macau-like return to the motherland. And we should make this declaration before the Taiwanese "go nuclear," either technologically or psychologically. As great powers have learned to their sorrow, tiny and high-strung dependencies have a way of making life hell for their supposed masters.

Freed from the Taiwan issue, the U.S. would then be able to think seriously about balancing the three great powers of Asia. So if Japan, for instance, marched down the nuclear road, that's another strategic Rubicon the U.S. would have to cross. Obviously other Asian powers would resist such Japanese rearmament, but that should be their problem, not ours. It's better to be the happy third in any such Asian struggle—not an unhappy primary participant.

In the meantime, we should also get smarter about being smarter. If the Indians and the Chinese continue to graduate 10 times as many technologists as the U.S., and if the Japanese continue to create the first post-human robot society, then Americans should keep from kidding themselves that our currently booming domestic real-estate market, for example, will assure our long-term geopolitical primacy. Instead, if we are serious about surviving, we need the 21st-century equivalent of Alexander Hamilton's 18th-century "Report on Manufactures"; that is, we should simply decide what industries we need in order to defend ourselves, and then launch a conscious techno-industrial policy to

make sure that those vital industries remain onshore.

Might this neo-Hamiltonian policy raise the price of t-shirts from China? Might it even raise interest rates, and perhaps lower the stock market? Fine. Slight economic dislocations are a small price to pay for true national security.

To be sure, there's no particular reason to believe that this balance-of-power approach, combined with an equally planned approach to defense production, is anywhere near to being adopted. For now, Americans seem to be bouncing between a nationalist-militarism that borders on suicide and a one-world neo-Angellism that borders on appeasement.

So one can only hope that the dire wake-up call, when it comes, will not be too damaging. Bad policies can be reversed, although, unfortunately, it usu-

ally takes a defeat to get the attention of policymakers and the public.

The history of world great-power conflict is too obvious—and too ominous—to be ignored. We need to see the trouble coming, and we should be ready, and steady, when it arrives. A proper balance-of-power strategy would mean that when conflict erupts, it erupts in other countries first. That's the formula for being the happy third, and it has been—and is—the right formula for dealing with ascendant and perhaps violent countries that we can't contain and don't want to fight. ■

James P. Pinkerton is a columnist for Newsday and a fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. He served in the White House under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

Bad For You Too?

How the Iraq War disappointed Israel

By Leon Hadar

THERE IS AN OLD JOKE about an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, and a Jew who are asked to write an essay about an elephant. The Englishman writes about "The Elephant and the British Empire." The Frenchman writes about "The Love Life of the Elephant." The pedantic German writes a large treatise on "The Toenail of the Elephant." And the Jew writes on "The Elephant and the Jewish Problem."

It's a Jewish joke dating back to the time when the fate of the insecure Jewish community in Europe depended very much on political and social changes in the surrounding non-Jewish environ-

ment. It pokes fun at the tendency of anxious Jews at that time to assess the latest news from this or that world capital—the Russian czar has the flu, the price of grain is going up, red shoes are becoming more fashionable—by whether or not it was "good for the Jews." When Jewish survival was at stake and inextricably tied to events beyond the community's control, it was not surprising that Jews would study almost anything—so why not an elephant?—based on its effect upon, and attitude toward, the so-called Jewish Problem. Was the elephant with us—or was it against us?

Native Israeli Jews who pride themselves on being more independent and self-confident than the supposedly wimpy “diaspora Jews” insist that they have rid themselves of that old obsession. The classic Zionist ethos has taught the New Jew to become more assertive, self-governing, and self-reliant. With their own sources of political, economic, and military power, Jews in Israel were expected to be able to control their destiny irrespective of whether the czar had the flu, the price of grain was going up, or red shoes were in fashion. In the words of Israel’s founding father, the late Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, “It doesn’t matter what the gentiles say; what matters is what the Jews do.”

Ben-Gurion was arguing that unlike their ancestors in the diaspora, Israelis have ceased to be passive actors on history’s stage who respond to what the “other” does or does not do. The Jews in Israel have become active players who can affect history and base their relationship with the gentiles on a sense of reciprocity. It is the elephant who would end up writing an essay on “The Jew and the Elephantine Problem.”

But Zionism was based on romantic expectations about one’s chosen group’s place in the world. In reality, much of the history of Zionism and Israel—from the 1917 Balfour Declaration to the 2000 second Intifada—reflected a continuing obsession with what the world does and thinks. In fact, Ben-Gurion made his comments, deriding the significance of the attitude of non-Jews to the Zionist project, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Sinai in the 1956 Arab-Israeli War, which he portrayed as a unilateralist Israeli action aimed at protecting the nation’s core interests. He forgot to mention that the Israelis would not have attacked Egypt without the support of Great Britain and France. Moreover, a few months later, Ben-Gurion was forced by the U.S. and the UN to with-

draw Israeli troops from the occupied territory.

What passes these days for foreign news in much of the Israeli media could come under the heading “The Elephant and the Israeli Problem,” with the U.S. playing the role of the elephant as Israelis try to deconstruct the latest development in Washington based on whether or not it is “good for the Jews.” In that context, White House aides, U.S. lawmakers, and American pundits who are Jewish are usually identified as such because that fact suggests that they are—or should be—predisposed to be sympathetic to the Jewish state. Similarly, from the coverage in the Israeli press of American presidential races, you would have to conclude that the major candidates are running for office in Israel. Any insignificant comment a candidate or his lowest-ranking aide makes about the Middle East—or the number of times they have visited Israel—is listed and analyzed by the Israelis. During the 2004 presidential race, for example, front-page headlines in Israeli newspapers pointed to the fact that Kerry’s brother Cameron converted to Judaism, the implication being that he would help stir the policy of the Kerry administration in a pro-Israeli direction.

My guess is that in Italy, Poland, and Greece, and in other countries that value their relationship with Washington, press coverage of the U.S., including presidential races, is not very different. I recall reading in French newspapers quite a lot about Kerry’s French connection, including the fact that one of his relatives was a French Green Party activist, and it was not surprising that George Stephanopoulos became a celebrity in Greece during the Clinton administration.

The irony is that the kind of obsession that Israeli Jews have with the status of the Jewish state in Washington would probably be depicted as crude anti-Semitism if it were exhibited by Ameri-

can politicians and pundits. One could imagine the outcry in Washington if a U.S. lawmaker were to identify, say, Sen. Barbara Boxer as Jewish and imply that her religious beliefs affect her attitude towards Israel. Or if an American journalist would suggest that the fact that Vice President Cheney’s aide Lewis “Scooter” Libby is Jewish colors his approach to the Middle East conflict. Or if American pundits would propose on the eve of the American invasion of Iraq that Israel and her American supporters were backing such a move because they believed it would advance the strategic interests of the Jewish state.

In fact, in the weeks leading up to the coalition attack on Iraq, Israeli officials and analysts were doing exactly that and were not even trying to hide their glee over American plans to conquer Mesopotamia. “Enthusiastic IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] Awaits War in Iraq,” screamed the headline in the respected Israeli daily *Ha’aretz* on Feb. 17, 2003. “The military and political leadership yearns for war in Iraq, seeing it as an opportunity to win the war of attrition with the Palestinians,” reported diplomatic editor Aluf Benn, who continued:

Senior IDF officers and those close to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, such as National Security Advisor Ephraim Halevy, paint a rosy picture of the wonderful future Israel can expect after the war. They envision a domino effect, with the fall of Saddam Hussein followed by that of Israel’s other enemies: Arafat, Hassan Nasrallah, Bashar Assad, the ayatollah in Iran and maybe even Muhammad Gadafi. Along with these leaders, will disappear terror and weapons of mass destruction.

Benn also noted that there was “excitement” in the IDF’s planning

department over the standoff between the U.S. and its NATO allies: "A paper distributed to the army's upper echelons even spoke of an opportunity to 'remove the pro-Palestinian Europeans from the Middle East.'" Israeli officials concluded, according to Benn, that the U.S. would "punish the Europeans for their back-stabbing on the road to Baghdad, and will no longer ask them for input regarding Israeli concessions."

Benn quotes Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, Coordinator of Government Activities in the West Bank and Gaza, voicing the Israeli army's belief that a U.S.-led war for regime change in Iraq would establish a precedent for, in Gilad's words, "the removal of other dictators closer to us who use violence and terror." Reflecting official and public Israeli attitudes at that time, polls indicated that a large majority of Israelis cheered the removal of Saddam Hussein by the Americans.

But after American critics of the planned war against Iraq raised these same points, suggesting that neocons were pressing for Saddam's ouster because they were hoping that it would help secure Israeli interests—much along the lines drawn by outspoken Israeli government and military officials—mainstream American media types seemed to insist that their countrymen must not speak as frankly as the Israelis. When then-*New York Times* columnist (and now editor) Bill Keller wrote about the possible effects of the invasion of Iraq on Israeli interests, he made it clear that he wasn't trying to advance "one of the more enduring conspiracy theories of the moment, the notion that we are about to send a quarter of a million American soldiers to war for the sake of Israel" and he even chose an ironic title for his piece, "Is It Good for the Jews?" But an alternative title, "Is It Good for Israel?" would certainly have captured the gist of his column—that the war was in Israel's interest.

An Iraqi intelligence fabricator seeking a cash reward from the U.S. authorities in Baghdad invented the information regarding a planned attack on the New York City subway system.

The false intelligence resulted in a state of high alert in New York City from Oct. 6–9. The complexity of the alleged plan was taken by New York City authorities as an indicator of credibility, but nearly every element was totally invented by the source, including the baby carriage and briefcase bomb-concealment devices and the details of how a group of 19 bombers was converging on New York City from around the Middle East and South Asia. Analysts in Iraq and also at Homeland Security in Washington realized immediately that the information was bogus as none of it could be confirmed, but New York City ignored that judgment and chose to respond to the possible threat. Homeland Security was subsequently miffed about the failure to co-ordinate a response and there are concerns that some local and state jurisdictions will now choose to ignore Washington in their responses to possible terrorist attacks.



Objections from the intelligence community to the reliability of information that Damascus is supporting the Iraqi insurgency has derailed likely White House approval to bomb Syria.

The usual cast of characters in the Pentagon wants limited air strikes based on a series of questionable reports from even more dubious agents that Syria is supporting the insurgency and is even encouraging cross-border operations. While it is undoubtedly true that small groups of insurgents receive safe haven in some Syrian villages, CIA and DIA, both of which are having periodic integrity attacks in the wake of 9/11 and Iraqi WMD failures, have insisted that there is no definitive evidence of Syrian government involvement. The tribesmen in most of the Syrian villages have family on both sides of the border. Some of them, like the recently targeted, Turkoman-inhabited Tal Afar, are not even Arab and are unlikely allies for the Sunni rebels. The resistance from the intelligence community has forced the issue into the open. Several contentious National Security Council meetings exploring the bombing option have made the White House nervous, resulting in an interim decision that escalating diplomatic and economic pressure on Syria should be allowed to play out first. The Pentagon bombing proposals reflect U.S. military frustration at the inability to contain the strengthening Iraqi insurgency. Syria continues to be a convenient scapegoat for failure in Baghdad. On Oct. 6, Bush described Syria as an "ally of convenience" for Iraqi terrorists and repeated his view that facilitators of terror will be judged by the same standards as the terrorists themselves. The White House seems unaware that the "Iraqization" of Syria by bringing about the overthrow of the secular Baath government of Bashir Assad would be a catastrophe for the entire region, leading almost certainly to a hostile and empowered fundamentalist regime. Even the Israelis have privately suggested that pressuring Syria is fine but beyond that it is best to leave Damascus alone.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates.

But was it? That is certainly not the conclusion that you would draw after skimming through analyses issued by Israeli experts since the collapse of Saddam's statue in downtown Baghdad and which suggest that America has been fighting the right war (against terrorism) in the wrong place (Iraq). "The war in Iraq did not damage international terror groups but instead distracted the United States from confronting other hotbeds of Islamic militancy and actually 'created momentum' for many terrorists," the Associated Press recently reported of a study conducted by "a top Israeli security think tank." The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University said that far from undermining Islamic militants, the Iraq War "has created momentum for many terrorist elements, but chiefly al-Qaida and its affiliates."

The center's director, Shai Feldman, suggested in the report that the vast amount of money and effort the United States has poured into Iraq has deflected attention from other centers of terrorism, such as Afghanistan. The focus of U.S. intelligence upon Iraq "has to be at the expense of being able to follow strategic dangers in other parts of the world," he wrote. The bottom line of this and other similar Israeli studies is that Iran, and not the United States, has emerged from the war in Iraq as the major winner.

Even more intriguing has been the way Israeli officials and pundits have scoffed at the Wilsonian fantasies of the neocons—fantasies of using the invasion of Iraq as the first stage of "democratizing" the Middle East. Not only have most Israeli experts suggested that such a scheme is impractical, they have also argued that the collapse of authoritarian regimes in places like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan is bound to bring to power anti-Israeli and anti-American forces. As Israeli leaders see it, the Jewish state would have a hard time

adjusting to a democratic Arab world in which public opinion, rather than centralized rulers, determined policy.

Yehezkel Dror, a political science professor at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, recently related the Israeli establishment's view: "We're all for democracy, but let us imagine democracy in Egypt or Jordan. Will it strengthen their peace with Israel?" Dror and his colleagues have concluded that the answer to this question is a clear "No!" That explains why *Newsweek* characterized the reputation of Natan Sharansky—George W. Bush's favorite author and the prophet of Middle Eastern democracy—in Israel as that of a "scorned idealist."

"I'm very frustrated," Sharansky told the international edition of *Newsweek*. "My ideas are not taken seriously at all [in Israel]." Why? Because they are perceived as "too disconnected from the harsh Middle East reality," Sharansky explained, noting that most Israelis believe that democracy in the Arab world could easily translate into even greater hostility toward Israel.

In short, there is a growing recognition in Israel that the Iraq War was not so good for the Jews. It has diverted attention and resources from the War on Terror and threatened to unleash anti-Israeli and anti-American forces in the Middle East—such as a Shi'ite clerical government in Iraq that could become an ally of a radical Shi'ite, nuclear-armed Iran, which would pose more of a long-term threat to the strategic interests of the Jewish state than the militarily weak Saddam ever did.

Israel's enthusiastic support for American intervention in Iraq was easy to understand: an opportunistic response by a client state that had hoped to get a free ride on a successful military operation against an anti-Israeli Arab state. "Unlike during the Roman Empire, this time the current reigning empire is with us," explained Likud politician Benjamin Netanyahu in the immediate after-

math of the successful U.S. military operation in Iraq. But what many Israelis failed to take into consideration was that the American Empire could fail. "What is interesting is that among the many scholars preoccupied with the war in Iraq, not a single one has discussed the possible outcome of an American withdrawal, in the wake of faulty handling of the war," Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz's* military analyst, wrote recently. If that happens, Israelis' "relatively optimistic intelligence assessment regarding strategic threats to the country would be eroded," he concluded.

The neoconservative strategic vision assumes that what is good for America is good for Israel, that a global and democratic American empire in control of the Middle East will help preserve Israel's interests while a strong and democratic Israel will help secure American concerns in the region. Neocons consider this an axiom and are amazed that most American Jews, most of whom did not vote for Bush in the last election, don't share their perspective. "The surprising thing is not that there are so many Jews who are neocons but that there are so many who are not," complained leading neocon and former Pentagon official Douglas Feith in an interview with *The New Yorker* early this year.

Many Americans concluded long ago that Israeli and American strategic interests are not always compatible and that the strong ties with the Jewish state are hurting the U.S. position in the Middle East. Some Israelis are now asking themselves whether they can count on the long-term support of an American Empire that, not unlike the Roman one, is bound to decline and shed its commitments in the Middle East. ■

Leon Hadar is a Cato Institute research fellow in foreign-policy studies and author, most recently, of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.

Border Bait and Switch

Promising immigration enforcement but delivering amnesty

By W. James Antle III

MARICOPA COUNTY may not be closest to Arizona's border with Mexico but it is nevertheless at the center of the state's growing problem with illegal immigration. County Attorney Andrew Thomas hopes to be part of the solution. His office is sponsoring the Southwest Conference on Illegal Immigration, Border Security and Crime in Phoenix, reaching out to nationally known commentators and experts on the issue.

The roster of invited speakers includes many noted allies of immigration restrictionists, including Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-Colo.), representatives of the Federation of American Immigration Reform and the Center for Immigration Studies, and *U.S. News and World Report* columnist John Leo. But also on the agenda are two names more familiar to restrictionists for their opposition—Stephen Moore and John Fund of the *Wall Street Journal*.

It might be asked what two pundits from the biggest editorial booster for open borders might contribute to a dialogue on solving the border-state illegal alien crisis. But these days, supporters of mass immigration don't often decree "there shall be open borders." Instead they are talking about the need to get tough on border security—just as soon as we make our legal-immigration policy loose enough to accommodate the crackdown. They insist they are not opponents of immigration reform; they are just more realistic reformers.

If this is a strategic shift, it has resounded at the highest levels of American politics. Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano and her New Mexico colleague Bill Richardson were widely praised when they declared a state of emergency on their states' southern borders. Both are Democrats and neither has been particularly friendly to immigration reformers. Napolitano, for instance, opposed Arizona's successful Proposition 200 ballot initiative to prevent illegal aliens from receiving taxpayer monies.

President Bush also seems to have gotten the memo. In late August appearances in California and Arizona, he stressed the need to guard the border. Bush acknowledged that illegal immigration was "putting a strain on your resources" and pledged "that the federal government will work closely with the state government and local government to provide assets, manpower [and] detention space ... to make sure this border of ours is secure."

The Bush administration has backed a self-styled Coalition for Border and Economic Security to marshal the resources of industry groups behind a guest-workers program. Former Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie is a principal organizer. The co-chairs are former Congressman Cal Dooley (D-Calif.), whose district included many immigrant workers, and former House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas), a favorite of economic and social conservatives. Membership may have its privileges, but they do not come free: the *Los Angeles Times* reported that admission into the coalition costs between \$50,000 and \$250,000 to fund the upcoming amnesty campaign blitz.

The idea is to marginalize conservatives who favor reduced immigration by triangulating the issue. The group also seeks to recreate the left-right coalition that torpedoed serious immigration reforms at least nominally supported by the Clinton White House back in 1996.

But they are running into problems. Business groups are reportedly reluctant to sign up because they fear conservatives will push the coalition in a more restrictionist direction. And in contrast with the alliance that upended the 1996 immigration-reform effort, ethnic lobbies do not seem to be playing a prominent role. Whatever interest the National Council of La Raza has in stopping a more stringent immigration policy, it cares more about its constituents' political clout than agribusiness's labor needs.

If the politics of the situation are difficult, it might be a reflection on the counterintuitive argument immigration triangulators are trying to make. That argument is perhaps best summarized by *New York Times* columnist David Brooks, speaking to an apocryphal "working-class guy from the south end of San Antonio": "The system is out of control. But we can't just act like lunkheads and think we can solve this problem with brute force. Tough enforcement laws make us feel good but they don't do the job ... we've tripled the number of Border Patrol agents and increased the enforcement budget 10 times over, but we haven't made a dent in the number of illegals ..."

In other words, the cause of illegal immigration is not that our borders are

too porous and our enforcement too lax. Instead our laws are overly restrictive, the argument goes, and our efforts to crack down fly in the face of legitimate economic considerations.

The middle-ground solution the self-designated immigration realists propose is to regularize many of the illegal workers already here, thus bringing them “out of the shadows” and into the law-abiding light of day, and invite more low-cost foreign labor into the country as guest workers. Then we can really get serious about policing the border because our immigration policy will have been adjusted to accommodate an alleged cheap, unskilled labor shortage.

However much support this approach has among the public, it has certainly developed a following on Capitol Hill. Both the bipartisan immigration legislation introduced by Sens. John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) and the rival bill sponsored by Sens. John Cornyn (R-Texas) and Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) create new visas for guest workers and pledge to step up enforcement.

Cornyn-Kyl is widely seen as containing tougher enforcement provisions than McCain-Kennedy. Their proposal also encourages illegals already here to return home before applying for their new guest-worker status—though the force of its deferred departure policy, essentially giving illegals up to five years to go home, is open to question. But commentators favorable to continued mass immigration are hopeful that what the two bills have in common is more important than the differences.

Tamar Jacoby, writing in *The Weekly Standard*, argued that they both point to “an emerging consensus” on a policy that is both “robust” (read: expansive) and “orderly.” Immigration reduction, however, is out.

The effort to make legalizing large numbers of illegal aliens look like a compromise was bound to run into

problems. One is that the combination of amnesty now and enforcement later has been tried before. “People accepted talk in ’86,” says Rosemary Jenks, vice president for government relations at Numbers USA. “They won’t now.”

Jenks is referring to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. It coupled amnesty for roughly 3 million illegal immigrants with employer sanctions and promises of stepped-up enforcement. The results were not encouraging: fraud among amnesty applicants was widespread, the enforcement failed to materialize, and illegal immigration increased. The immigration authorities also found themselves overwhelmed by the amnesty applications.

This last issue has critics questioning whether the new immigration realists are being very realistic. Under any proposal along the lines of McCain-Kennedy or Cornyn-Kyl, the Department of Homeland Security’s immigration bureaucracy will be charged with approving temporary work permits and monitoring compliance. With an illegal population approaching 12 million, the number of eligible applicants will be huge. Ineligible applicants are likely to slip through as bureaucrats try to implement the new policy, inevitably under political pressure.

Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, has been forceful on this point. “These bills expect dysfunctional agencies to assume huge new workloads,” he says. “DHS can’t handle its current workload,” Jenks agrees, “yet under these bills they might have to process 11 million applications.”

Guest-workers proponents are likewise unrealistic about the immigration status quo. The repeated assertions that we have tried enforcement but it has failed are based on the amount of money spent on border-patrol agents and bureaucratic budgets without looking

at whether Washington actually did anything with the money. Interior enforcement has been lax and employer sanctions underutilized. Workplace arrests of illegal aliens actually declined between 1999 and 2003 and employment-verification programs are in their infancy. As long as illegals can find employment and work without realistic fear of deportation, new border-security initiatives will do little to keep them from flouting immigration laws.

This non-enforcement also undercuts the economic rationale for making illegal immigrants guest workers. The demand for this cheap foreign labor is not entirely a free-market phenomenon. Failures of government policy have given employers a vast pool of willing low-skilled workers, whose family education and health-care needs are to a large extent being subsidized by the taxpayers. This didn’t happen in a vacuum and creates disincentives for wage increases and modernization in fields where illegal aliens reach critical mass. This is closer to corporate welfare than *laissez-faire*.

But the biggest shortcoming of the grand guest-workers compromise is that it completely ignores many of the reasons Americans want immigration reform in the first place: cultural balkanization, national identity, and linguistic unity. Proponents of the temporary-workers approach assign a higher priority to the economic needs of a relatively small band of employers than to social cohesion.

Moreover, many problems created by immigration stem not from its illegality but the sheer numbers. Increasing legal immigration and giving work permits to illegal aliens will do little to alleviate them and may well make them worse.

A guest-workers bill is unlikely to pass before the midterm elections, when we may see whose immigration politics play better in Maricopa County—the redesigned open-borders Republicans’ or Tom Tancredo’s. ■

The Miller's Tale

Far from being a martyr for press freedom, the *New York Times* reporter was Chalabi's mouthpiece.

By Justin Raimondo

LIBERALS HEAR THE WORDS “prosecutor” and “subpoena” in the same sentence as the word “journalist,” and their knees jerk uncontrollably. Ye gods! To the barricades! Thus the board of the American Society of Journalists rushed to defend *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller, who was refusing to testify in the Plame leak case, by pinning her with their Conscience in Media Award. That is, until they belatedly discovered that she doesn't have a conscience. As *Editor and Publisher* put it:

The group's First Amendment committee had narrowly voted to give Miller the prize for her dedication to protecting sources, but the full board has now voted to not accept that decision, based on its opinion that her entire career, and even her current actions in the Plame/CIA leak case, cast doubt on her credentials for this award.

ASJ President Jack El-Hai noted opposition from the membership of his organization, which he summed up as “A feeling that Miller's career, taken as a whole, did not make her the best candidate for the award.”

A masterpiece of understatement, but if the War Party was giving out awards for journalistic excellence—say, the Leo Strauss Prize for Fiction Disguised as Reporting—Judy would win it hands down. The full story of her contribution to Iraq's WMD mythos would fill a multi-volume set. But the most egregious—and, in retrospect, most telling—example of Miller's role as a war propagandist

came out on Sept. 18, 2002, in a *New York Times* story that touted the claims of one Khidhir Hamza, an alleged Iraqi “nuclear weapons scientist” who estimated that in two to three years Saddam would have the capacity to wield a nuclear sword. As it turned out, however, Hamza was not any kind of scientist, never having conducted a single scientific experiment, and was possessed, according to Imad Khadduri—a real Iraqi nuclear physicist who supervised key aspects of Iraq's weapons program—of a “deep inner fear of radiation” that “prevented him from ever entering the reactor hall or touching any scientific gadgets, probably due to his continual fear of an electric jolt that he experienced as a child.”

Hamza showed up at the doorstep of Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress in 1994. The INC, which was on the U.S. payroll collecting “intelligence,” recommended him to their CIA handlers, but something about Hamza didn't quite add up, and Langley wasn't interested. It was a healthy instinct that steered the CIA away from Hamza—and caused the agency to view Chalabi with something less than enthusiasm—and not just because the Iraqi defector exaggerated his scientific credentials.

Hamza handed over documents, including a 20-page “progress report” on Iraq's nuclear weapons program, which eventually wended their way to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the winter of 1995, IAEA inspectors made a surprise visit to Baghdad, where they showed up at the

offices of Iraq's nuclear development agency armed with the “progress report”—complete with diagrams—which purported to show that Iraq was in the advanced stages of nuke-making. This was the smoking gun the War Party had long been looking for: it seemed that Hamza—and Miller—were vindicated.

Upon closer inspection, however, IAEA personnel noted discrepancies in the document. To begin with, it seemed to have been written by an Iranian. “Most notable,” says Khadduri, “was the use of the term ‘dome’—‘Qubba’ in Iranian, instead of ‘hemisphere’—‘Nisuf Kura’ in Arabic.” This and other internal clues convinced the IAEA that Hamza's report had originally been written in Farsi and translated into Arabic. It was “not authentic,” as an IAEA spokesman put it. That is to say, it was a forgery.

When Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the prosecutor in the Plame leak case, hears the word “forgery,” he reaches for the legalistic equivalent of his revolver—his subpoena power. That's because forgery is what *l'affaire* Plame is all about. It was the Niger uranium forgeries—documents purporting to be correspondence between Niger government officials and the Iraqis—that served as the basis for the administration's contention that Saddam had tried to procure weapons-grade uranium in “an African nation,” as the president averred in his 2003 State of the Union address. Shortly afterwards, the IAEA debunked the documents as fakes: an hour with Google sufficed to prove that these were forgeries, and crude ones at that.

The White House, red-faced, tried to downplay the importance of the documents in crafting those fateful 16 words, but renewed focus on this startling lapse was brought to bear four months later by former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson, whose op-ed piece, “What I Didn’t Find In Africa,” led to the administration’s campaign to discredit him—and ended in the “outing” of his wife, Valerie Plame, a CIA agent who worked covertly in the field of nuclear-weapons proliferation. The exposure of Plame triggered an FBI investigation, which set “Bulldog” Fitzgerald not only on the trail of the outers but also sniffing around for a hint of who forged the Niger uranium papers.

On May 20, 2004, combined Iraqi and American forces raided Chalabi’s home and descended on the offices of the Iraqi National Congress, seizing documents, computers, and—much to the outrage of Chalabi’s fan club over at the American Enterprise Institute—even

tion directly to the Baghdad station chief of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

An intelligence source in Washington was cited in news accounts as saying that hard evidence of the betrayal was contained in an electronic communications intercept by the National Security Agency that wound up in Iranian hands: “This was ‘sensitive compartmented information’—SCI—and it was tracked right back to the Iranians through Aras Habib,” a longtime aide to Chalabi. He headed the INC’s Pentagon-funded “intelligence collection” program that funneled defectors’ tall tales to the administration and the media in the run-up to war. Habib fled to Iran just in time to avoid being caught in the raid.

Habib’s job was to retail the fabrications of Iraqi exiles, such as Hamza, to Western governments and media outlets, and all this was grist for Miller’s mill. In the aftermath of an invasion that yielded zero evidence of Iraq’s fabled

seized it: not out of spite, as Chalabi’s defenders claimed, but as evidence of his espionage on behalf of Iran.

Fitzgerald’s inquiry was sparked by the outing of Plame, but in tracing this act of treachery back to its origins he may have uncovered new trails leading to other crimes—perhaps even treason. Law enforcement sources insist they have “rock solid” evidence that Chalabi & Co. delivered vital U.S. secrets to the Iranians, but who among those government officials with access to this highly compartmentalized information gave Chalabi access? Fitzgerald is no doubt interested in the answer to this question.

As the major journalistic conduit through which Chalabi’s lies made their way into the media and became the conventional wisdom, Miller was at the epicenter of the INC-Iranian disinformation campaign. In short, she knows where all the bodies are buried.

That’s why she spent 85 days in jail. Not because she hadn’t understood I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s clear waiver giving her permission to testify but because Fitzgerald finally agreed to narrow the range of his questioning to matters only pertaining directly to her conversations with Libby. The idea that she is a martyr to the concept of a free press inverts her real role in this matter, which has been to obstruct not only justice but also truth—the truth about how we were lured into the Iraqi quagmire by unscrupulous government officials of dubious loyalty. She isn’t protecting the First Amendment. Instead, she is shielding a cabal of traitors caught up in the web of their own betrayals. As government prosecutors untangle the threads, the spider in the center seeks to scuttle away and hide itself—in the end, however, it can only bare its fangs as the exterminators move in for the kill. ■

Justin Raimondo is editorial director of Antiwar.com.

MILLER WAS AT THE EPICENTER OF THE INC-IRANIAN DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN. SHE, IN SHORT, KNOWS WHERE ALL THE BODIES ARE BURIED.

Chalabi’s personal copy of the Koran. The Pentagon’s favorite Iraqi exile leader, who had been flown into Iraq on the eve of the invasion at U.S. taxpayers’ expense, had gone from being the toast of the White House to occupying the dog house—and, for a while there, it even looked as if he might wind up in the big house as an Iraqi court charged him with corruption and other crimes. What caused this meteoric descent in his fortunes? The mystery was cleared up when it came out that Chalabi was suspected of handing over vital U.S. intelligence to the Iranians, including the knowledge that the Americans had broken the Iranian code. Apparently Chalabi communicated this informa-

tion directly to the Baghdad station chief of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security. An intelligence source in Washington was cited in news accounts as saying that hard evidence of the betrayal was contained in an electronic communications intercept by the National Security Agency that wound up in Iranian hands: “This was ‘sensitive compartmented information’—SCI—and it was tracked right back to the Iranians through Aras Habib,” a longtime aide to Chalabi. He headed the INC’s Pentagon-funded “intelligence collection” program that funneled defectors’ tall tales to the administration and the media in the run-up to war. Habib fled to Iran just in time to avoid being caught in the raid. Habib’s job was to retail the fabrications of Iraqi exiles, such as Hamza, to Western governments and media outlets, and all this was grist for Miller’s mill. In the aftermath of an invasion that yielded zero evidence of Iraq’s fabled

How I Became a Conservative

In praise of beauty, order, history, and Edmund Burke

By Roger Scruton

I WAS BROUGHT UP at a time when half the English people voted Conservative and almost all English intellectuals regarded “conservative” as a term of abuse. To be a conservative was to be on the side of age against youth, the past against the future, authority against innovation, the “structures” against spontaneity and life. One had no choice, as a free-thinking intellectual, but to reject conservatism. The choice remaining was between reform and revolution. Do we improve society bit by bit, or do we rub it out and start again? My contemporaries favored the second option, and it was when witnessing what this meant, in Paris in May 1968, that I discovered my vocation.

In the street below my window the students were shouting and smashing. The plate-glass windows of the shops appeared to shudder then give up the ghost, as the reflections suddenly left them and they slid in jagged fragments to the ground. Cars rose into the air and landed on their sides, their juices flowing from unseen wounds. The air was filled with triumphant shouts as lamp-posts were uprooted and piled to form a barricade against the next vanload of policemen.

The van came cautiously round the corner, jerked to a halt, and disgorged a score of frightened policemen. They were greeted by flying cobblestones and several of them fell. One rolled over on the ground clutching his face, from which the blood streamed through clenched fingers. There was an exultant shout, the injured policeman was helped

into the van, and the students ran off down a side street, sneering at the *cochons* and throwing cobbles as they went.

That evening a friend came round: she had been on the barricades and was very excited. Great victories had been scored: policemen injured, cars set alight, slogans chanted, graffiti daubed. The bourgeoisie were on the run, and soon the Old Fascist and his regime would be begging for mercy.

The Old Fascist was de Gaulle, whose *Mémoires de Guerre* I had been reading that day. The memoirs begin with a striking sentence—*Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France*. I had been equally struck by the description of the state funeral for Valéry—de Gaulle’s first public gesture on liberating Paris. The image of the cortège, as it made its way to Notre Dame, the proud general first among the mourners, and here and there a German sniper still looking down from the rooftops, had made a vivid impression on me. I compared the two bird’s-eye views of Paris: that of the sniper and my own on to the riots in the Quartier Latin. They were related as yes and no, the affirmation and denial of a national idea. According to the Gaullist vision, a nation is defined not by institutions or borders but by language, religion, and high culture; in times of turmoil and conquest it is those spiritual things that must be protected and reaffirmed.

Of course I was naïve—as naïve as my friend. But the ensuing argument is one to which I have often returned. What, I

asked, do you propose to put in the place of this “bourgeoisie” whom you so despise and to whom you owe the freedom and prosperity that enable you to play on your toy barricades? What vision of France and its culture compels you? And are you prepared to die for your beliefs, or merely to put others at risk in order to display them? I was pompous, but for the first time in my life I felt a surge of political anger, finding myself on the other side of the barricades from the people I knew.

She replied with a book: Foucault’s *Les mots et les choses*, the bible of the *soixante-huitards*, the text that seemed to justify every transgression by showing that obedience is merely defeat. It is an artful book, composed with a satanic mendacity, selectively appropriating facts in order to show that culture and knowledge are nothing but the “discourses” of power. Its goal is subversion, and it argues that “truth” is tied to the form of consciousness imposed by the class that profits from its propagation. Look everywhere for power, he tells his readers, and you will find it. Where there is power, there is oppression. And where there is oppression, there is the right to destroy.

My friend is now a good bourgeoisie like the rest of them. The French intellectuals have turned their backs on 1968. Foucault is dead from AIDS. However, his books are on university reading lists all over Europe and America. His vision of European culture as the institutionalized form of oppressive power is taught as gospel to students who have

neither the culture nor the religion to resist. Only in France is he widely regarded as a charlatan.

By 1971, when I moved from Cambridge to a permanent lectureship at Birkbeck College, London, I had become a conservative. So far as I could discover there was only one other conservative, the Neapolitan lady who served meals and cocked a snook at the lecturers by plastering her counter with kitschy photos of the pope.

My failure to conceal my conservative beliefs was both noticed and disapproved, and I began to think that I should look for another career.

I used my mornings to study for the bar. In fact I never practiced since I had a mortgage by then and could not afford the unpaid year of pupillage without which barristers cannot take cases of their own. I therefore received from my studies only an intellectual benefit—for which I have always been profoundly grateful. The common law of England is proof that there is a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power, that power can exist without oppression, and that authority is a living force in human conduct.

Inspired by my new studies, I began to search for a conservative philosophy. American intellectual life benefits from patriotism, which has made it possible to defend American customs and institutions without fear of being laughed to scorn. It has benefited too from the Cold War, which sharpened native wits against the Marxist enemy. In '70s Britain, conservative philosophy was the preoccupation of a few half-mad recluses. Searching the library of my college I found Marx, Lenin, and Mao, but no Strauss, Voegelin, Hayek, or Friedman.

The view has long prevailed in England that conservatism is no longer available as a social and political creed. Maybe, if you are a child of wealthy and settled parents, you might inherit conser-

vative beliefs. But you couldn't possibly acquire them by any process of rational enquiry. And yet there I was, fresh from the shock of 1968 with a fully articulated set of conservative beliefs. Where could I look for the people who shared them, for the thinkers who had spelled them out, for the social, economic, and political theory that would give them force and authority sufficient to argue in the forum of academic opinion?

To my rescue came Burke. Although not widely read at the time in our universities, he had not been dismissed as stupid, reactionary, or absurd. He was simply irrelevant, of interest largely because he got everything wrong about the French Revolution and therefore could be studied as illustrating an episode in intellectual pathology.

Burke was of interest to me on account of the intellectual path that he had trodden. Although I didn't find much of philosophical significance in his "Essay on the Sublime and the Beautiful," I could see that, in the right cultural climate, it would convey a powerful sense of the meaning of aesthetic judgment and of its indispensable place in our lives.

I learned as a teenager that aesthetic judgment matters, that it is not merely a subjective opinion. It seemed to me the aesthetics of modernism, with its denial of the past, its vandalization of the landscape and townscape, and its attempt to purge the world of history, was also a denial of community, home, and settlement. Like Burke, therefore, I made the passage from aesthetics to conservative politics with no sense of intellectual incongruity, believing that I was in search of a lost experience of home. Underlying that sense of loss is the belief that what has been lost can also be recaptured—not necessarily as it was when it first slipped our grasp, but as it will be when consciously regained and remodeled to reward us for all the toil of

separation through which we are condemned by our original transgression.

Burke persuaded me that the utopian promises of socialism go hand in hand with a wholly abstract vision of the human mind. He persuaded me that societies are not and cannot be organized according to a plan, that there is no direction to history. Most of all he emphasized that the new forms of politics, which hope to organize society around the rational pursuit of liberty, equality, fraternity, or their modernist equivalents, are actually forms of militant irrationality. There is no way in which people can collectively pursue liberty, equality, and fraternity, not only because those things are abstractly defined but also because collective reason doesn't work that way.

Three other arguments of Burke's made a comparable impression. The first was the defense of authority and obedience. Society, he argued, is not held together by the abstract rights of the citizen, as the French Revolutionaries supposed. It is held together by authority—the right to obedience rather than the mere power to compel it. And obedience, in its turn, is the prime virtue of political beings, the disposition that makes it possible to govern them and without which societies crumble into "the dust and powder of individuality." In effect, Burke was upholding the old view of man in society—as subject of a sovereign—against the new view of him—as citizen of a state. In defending this old view, Burke demonstrated that it was a far more effective guarantee of the liberties of the individual than the new idea, which was founded in the promise of those very liberties, only abstractly, universally, and therefore unreal defined. Real freedom that can actually be defined, claimed, and granted, was not the opposite of obedience but its other side. The abstract, unreal freedom of the liberal intellect

was nothing more than childish disobedience, amplified into anarchy.

The second argument of Burke's that impressed me was the subtle defense of tradition, prejudice, and custom. As a schoolboy I had been struck by Eliot's "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in which tradition is represented as a constantly evolving yet continuous thing, which is remade with every addition to it and which adapts the past to the present and the present to the past. This conception made my love of the classics into a valid part of my psyche as a modern human being.

ALTHOUGH **SOCIETY CAN BE SEEN AS A CONTRACT**, BURKE ARGUED, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT MOST PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT ARE **EITHER DEAD OR NOT YET BORN**.

Burke's defense of "prejudice"—the set of beliefs and ideas that arise instinctively and reflect the root experiences of social life—brought home to me that our most necessary beliefs may be both unjustified and unjustifiable from our own perspective, and that the attempt to justify them will lead merely to their loss. Replacing them with the abstract rational systems of the philosophers, we may think ourselves better equipped for life in the modern world. But in fact we are less well equipped, and our new beliefs are far less justified, for the very reason that they are justified by ourselves. The real justification for a prejudice is the one that justifies it as a prejudice, rather than as a rational conclusion.

The final argument that impressed me was Burke's response to the theory of the social contract. Although society can be seen as a contract, he argued, we must recognize that most parties to the contract are either dead or not yet born. The effect of contemporary Rousseauist ideas was to place the present members of society in a position of dominance over those who went before and

those who come after. These ideas led directly to the massive squandering of inherited resources at the Revolution and to the cultural and ecological vandalism that is the principal danger of modern politics.

In those deft, cool thoughts, Burke summarized my instinctive doubts about the cry for liberation, my hesitations about progress and about the unscrupulous belief in the future that has perverted modern politics. In effect, Burke was joining in the old Platonic cry for a form of politics that would also be a form of nurture, a care for absent generations.

The graffiti paradoxes of 1968 were the very opposite of this: a kind of adolescent insouciance, a throwing away of all customs, institutions, and achievements for the sake of a momentary exultation.

Most of my friends at the time were literary people with no interest in politics. Among the exceptions were two academics—John Casey and Maurice Cowling. I also had the good fortune to meet one or two Conservative politicians, the most notable and likeable of whom was Hugh Fraser. Thus was founded the Conservative Philosophy Group. John Casey and I were to search the intellectual world for conservatives; Hugh and Jonathan Aitken were to search the Conservative Party for members who could think.

None of us had much success. Nevertheless, the Conservative Philosophy Group existed for 20 or more years, addressed at first by some of the most serious postwar political thinkers—Hayek, Oakeshott, Friedman, and Elie Kedourie—but gradually succumbing to inanition as the Conservative Party drifted in the stagnant days of John

Major. Once or twice Mrs. Thatcher looked in—an unwelcome intrusion, since politicians lose all self-respect in the presence of their leader and seem quite unable to appreciate that the shabby academic who is speaking might have more to say. In any case, we had little influence on the high command of the party, and none whatsoever on the academic world. Our meetings were attended by backbenchers too sincere to expect promotion, dons too contrary to learn from others, and—that most creative and under-acknowledged segment of our intellectual heritage—drunken right-wing journalists.

After four years of the Conservative Philosophy Group, and by now a barrister, I applied to join the Conservative Party's list of candidates. A veteran Member of Parliament, Dame Something Something, who conformed exactly to the old image of the blue-rinse maiden aunt, demanded what I had done for the party.

I mentioned that I had founded the Conservative Philosophy Group. She made it clear that the conjunction of "conservative" and "philosophy" was so absurd that she could only doubt the existence of such an organization. She asked me whether I wrote in the press, and I replied that I had written book reviews for the *Spectator*, so confirming her suspicion that if my name ever did appear in newspapers it would be in the wrong parts of them. I added that I had also written a book.

"A book? On what subject?"

I hesitated. "Aesthetics."

Her stare became suddenly vacant. She closed the file containing my application and turned to her colleague, a young MP.

"I suppose he could apply for this new European Parliament thing, could he?"

I indicated that I did not believe in parliaments where there was no national loyalty. She laughed at the

quaintness of my words—the first sign that laughter lay within her behavioral repertoire. And then, after brief handshakes, I was dismissed.

I ceased to be an intellectual Conservative and became a conservative intellectual instead. This was an even worse idea. Vociferous conservatives are accepted in politics but not in the intellectual world. I should have learned from Spinoza, who refused to publish his *Ethics*, and who chose for his device the single word *caute*—“be cautious”—inscribed beneath a rose, the symbol of secrecy. Instead I decided to go public, with *The Meaning of Conservatism*. My credentials as an anachronism were

vatism, Maurice told me, is a political practice, the legacy of a long tradition of pragmatic decision-making and high-toned contempt for human folly. To try to encapsulate it in a philosophy was the kind of naïve project that Americans might undertake.

One of our earliest contributors was Ray Honeyford, the Bradford headmaster who argued for a policy of integration in our schools as the only way of averting ethnic conflict. Honeyford was branded a racist, horribly pilloried, and eventually sacked for saying what everyone now admits to be true. This episode was our first great success, and led to the 600 subscriptions that we needed.

required by life in the postmodern world. What the *soixante-huitards* hoped to achieve by violence has been accomplished far more effectively by the peaceful self-censorship natural to the academic mind. Perceiving the rightness and necessity of this, I left the university and took up farming.

Nevertheless I remain what I have been since May 1968—a conservative intellectual who not only loves the high culture of Europe but believes it to be the repository of what we Europeans should know. It is, to put it bluntly, our best hope for the past. Such a hope animated de Gaulle; it enabled him to save his country not once but twice. And, by deflecting us from our self-centered projects, it offers a guarantee of national survival.

The years of conflict have taught me that few share my convictions and that all attempts to conserve things come too late. But the philosopher who most clearly perceived this truth brought a message of peace: “when philosophy paints its grey-in-grey, then is a form of life grown old. The Owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the gathering of the dusk.” Hegel’s words describe not the view from that attic window in the Quartier Latin, but the soul that absorbed it. It was not to change things, or to be part of things, or to be swept along by things, that I made my pilgrimage to Paris. It was to observe, to know, to understand. And so I acquired the consciousness of death and dying, without which the world cannot be loved for what it is. That, in essence, is what it means to be a conservative. ■

CONSERVATISM IS A POLITICAL PRACTICE, THE LEGACY OF A LONG TRADITION OF PRAGMATIC DECISION-MAKING AND HIGH-TONED CONTEMPT FOR HUMAN FOLLY.

thereby established, and when the Salisbury Group, a loose collection of reactionaries founded in memory of the great third Marquess of Salisbury, decided to found a journal, they alighted on me.

The first difficulty was that of finding people to write. I had friends in the academic world who were prepared in private to confess to conservative sympathies, but they were acutely aware of the risks attached to “coming out.”

The second difficulty was establishing a readership. To pay for itself, *The Salisbury Review* would require 600 subscribers or more. I was confident that there were at least 600 intellectual conservatives in Britain. The problem was finding them.

The third difficulty was that of conservatism itself. I was told by Maurice Cowling that I was deceiving myself if I thought that conservative politics could be given a philosophical backing sufficient to put it on a par with socialism, liberalism, nationalism, and all the other -isms that conservatism isn’t. Conser-

It was not only the issues of ethnic relations and national identity that provoked the British intellectual establishment. *The Salisbury Review* was belligerently anti-communist, it was explicitly critical of feminism, modernism, post-modernism, and deconstruction. Above all, it was anti-egalitarian, defending achievement against mediocrity, virtue against vice. Although all those positions are now widely accepted, we had the good fortune to express them at a time when each was actively censored by some group of sanctimonious halfwits. Hence we survived.

Still, there was a price to pay. It became a matter of honor among intellectuals to disassociate themselves from me, to write, if possible, damning and contemptuous reviews of my books, and to block my chances of promotion.

In time I came to see that they were right. Someone who believes in real distinctions between people has no place in a humanities department, the main purpose of which is to deliver the ideology

Roger Scruton has been professor of Aesthetics at Birkbeck College, London and professor at Boston University. This essay is adapted from Gentle Regrets: Thoughts From a Life. Reprinted by permission of The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York/London.

Selling Out - \$1.3 Trillion of American Companies Sold to Foreign Corps

The following staggering amount of our wealth producing companies has been sold to foreign owners in the 10 years from 1995 through 2005. Below is a partial list of the 8,600 U.S. companies sold.

It is critical to understand that even if these are not all familiar corporate names, they are all very valuable strategic companies with vast amounts of technology, assets, production facilities, tax base, and employment attached to each one. In fact, many of the smallest, most unfamiliar acquisitions represent some of the most significant strategic and proprietary technology losses to this country. Many of these companies took decades, and in some cases generations, to build to their size and scope prior to acquisition. Not only does the US lose control of the assets and technologies of these companies as of the date they were acquired, the US also loses all future profit and title to all future advancements of these companies.

These companies were the means through which America created much of its present wealth. With the loss of these companies and having no comparable replacement, it's easy to see that our future will not be as good as our past, especially since the countries that acquired these companies are now able to compete with us in almost all industries. Why are we doing this? Don't we have alternatives? Who is responsible, demand answers from your congressperson.

The following table lists only a few of the 8,600 foreign acquisitions during this period. The \$1.3 Trillion figure and complete list can be verified at the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

FORMER AMERICAN CORP	NEW FOREIGN OWNER	PURCHASING COUNTRY	AMOUNT PAID
Amoco Corp	British Petroleum Co	United Kingdom	\$48.174 Billion
Arco	BP Amoco	United Kingdom	\$27.224 Billion
AirTouch Communications	Vodafone Group	United Kingdom	\$60.287 Billion
VoiceStream Wireless	Deutsche Telekom AG	Germany	\$29.404 Billion
Chrysler Corp	Daimler-Benz AG	Germany	\$40.466 Billion
Simon & Schuster	Pearson PLC	United Kingdom	\$4.600 Billion
Household International	HSBC Holdings	United Kingdom	\$15.294 Billion
CIT Group Inc	Tyco International Ltd	Bermuda	\$9.341 Billion
PacifiCorp	Scottish Power PLC	United Kingdom	\$12.600 Billion
Niagara Mohawk Holdings	National Grid Group PLC	United Kingdom	\$8.048 Billion
Ernst & Young	Cap Gemini SA	France	\$11.774 Billion
MCI Communications	Cable & Wireless PLC	United Kingdom	\$1.750 Billion
Knight-Ridder Information	MAID PLC	United Kingdom	\$0.420 Billion
MCA Inc	Matsushita Electric	Japan	\$7.406 Billion
Columbia Pictures	Sony USA Inc	Japan	\$4.792 Billion
MGM/UA Communications	Pathe Communications	Luxembourg	\$1.709 Billion
Firestone Tire & Rubber	Bridgestone Corp	Japan	\$2.533 Billion
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co	Michelin SA	France	\$1.500 Billion
Miller Brewing	South African Breweries	United Kingdom	\$5.574 Billion
International Steel Group	Ispat International	Netherlands	\$3.813 Billion
PaineWebber Group Inc	UBS AG	Switzerland	\$12.243 Billion
Aetna-Financial Services	ING Group NV	Netherlands	\$4.933 Billion
PIMCO Advisor Holdings	Allianz AG	Germany	\$1.930 Billion
Bankers Trust New York	Deutsche Bank AG	Germany	\$8.082 Billion
SmithKline Beckman Corp	Beecham Group PLC	United Kingdom	\$7.922 Billion
Chiron Diagnostics Corp	Bayer AG	Germany	\$1.100 Billion
IBM Corp - Hard Disk Drive	Hitachi Ltd	Japan	\$2.050 Billion
IBM Personal Computers	Lenovo	Hong Kong	\$1.751 Billion
Houghton Mifflin Co	Vivendi Universal	France	\$2.272 Billion
Random House Inc	Bertelsmann AG	Germany	\$1.300 Billion
Doubleday Publishing	Bertelsmann AG	Germany	\$0.500 Billion
John Hancock Financial	Manulife Financial	Canada	\$11.063 Billion
TransAmerica Corp	Aegon NV	Netherlands	\$9.691 Billion
United Defense Industries	BAE Systems	United Kingdom	\$4.199 Billion

To view additional companies sold go to www.EconomyInCrisis.org.

ECONOMY IN CRISIS
CREATING AWARENESS OF OUR TRUE ECONOMIC CONDITION

Arts & Letters

FILM

[North Country]

A Woman's Place Is in the Mine

By Steve Sailer

FOR YEARS AFTER the Anita Hill brouhaha of 1991, the American news media obsessed over her sexually harassed sistren. Remember how shocked the press was when it discovered that Navy fighter jocks celebrating the Desert Storm victory at their 1991 Tailhook convention in a Las Vegas hotel did not behave like officers and gentlemen?

The press declared 1992 the Year of the Woman, and Bill and Hillary Clinton rode feminist outrage into the White House ... which posed a sticky problem. Governor Clinton had made uncounted sexual advances toward his state employees, and the laws of probability suggested that at least a few of them were unwanted and thus legally actionable. In December 1992, I wrote an article (which nobody would publish) forecasting, "Some enterprising reporter is going to think it worth his while to go Pulitzer hunting among the secretarial pools and law offices of Little Rock," and the revelations could threaten the Clinton presidency.

Indeed, David Brock's investigative reporting led to Paula Jones's sexual-harassment lawsuit—which Clinton eventually settled for \$850,000—in which Clinton perjured himself over Monica Lewinsky, causing his impeachment.

You might assume that the sexual-harassment issue died of hypocrisy in

1998 when feminists stood by the wounded Clinton, but the Left's long march through the institutions is immune to shame. The media is perhaps the key institution—because, as Orwell noted in 1984, "Who controls the past," ran the Party slogan, 'controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.'"

So now we have "North Country," a thoroughly fictionalized retelling of the landmark *Jenson v. Eveleth* sexual-harassment case. Charlize Theron, the 2003 Best Actress winner for "Monster," stars as a gorgeous miner who learns that the men who labor in the open pits of the Mesabi Iron Range are crude. Ultimately, she wins a "hostile environment" lawsuit against the mine.

Unlike in "Monster," where Charlize famously had her lovely complexion artificially weathered, here she looks like what she is, a former model posing amidst vast heaps of rubble. (Charlize recently attributed her beauty to thinking nice thoughts, burling to Oprah, "I really believe that we look physically the way we do because of the emotional impact that we've made on our bodies during our life." Well, sure ...)

Still, Charlize's face is bland, distinguishable from all the gaunt blondes in Hollywood only by a layer of adorable baby fat.

Her "North Country" heroine is equally dull. Feminist victimism has rendered actresses' roles more two-dimensional—notice how few *femme fatale* characters there are anymore?—denying them any less-than-saintly motivations while insisting, stupidly, that they compete with men in physical strength.

Still, "North Country" works fairly well until the cliché-addled courtroom climax. The supporting cast—Sean Bean, Sissy Spacek as the iron miner's mother, and Richard Jenkins as Charlize's long-suffering miner father—is

strong. As Charlize's best friend, the always terrific Frances McDormand dusts off the Northern Plains accent that won her an Oscar as the pregnant sheriff in "Fargo," but McDormand's mastery just highlights how vague Charlize's attempted accent is.

Strikingly, even an agitprop film like "North Country" is more informative about sexual harassment cases than most journalism has been. Screenwriters need dramatic conflict, so "North Country" explores the clashing interests of women, while the press coverage mostly bought into the fiction of female solidarity against men. Perhaps the best scene comes when the homemaker wife of Charlize's abusive boss screams at her to keep her hands off her husband at work.

Moreover, reporters took their storylines straight from the plaintiff attorney's press releases and thus ignored—because contingency fee lawyers focus upon the deeper-pocketed defendants—that the union is often more culpable than the corporation.

In contrast, "North Country" makes clear that the union members were more upset than the mine's owner by women entering the workforce. Well-paid industrial unions disliked admitting women members because doubling the potential supply of labor made high wages harder to sustain. Moreover, management finds it easier to browbeat women into believing they don't deserve a raise, and their presence undermines the fraternal solidarity needed for successful strikes.

It's no coincidence that industrial unions became moribund during the feminist era when the government forced heavy industry to hire women. With only 7.9 percent of private-sector workers unionized today, this latest denigration of organized labor seems like overkill. ■

Rated R for much vulgar abuse.

BOOKS

[*Between Two Worlds: The Inner Lives of Children of Divorce*, Elizabeth Marquardt, Crown, 288 pages]

Broken Homes, Broken Children

By Mary Eberstadt

SPY SUPERNOVELIST John le Carré, as keen a psychologist as any, once captured in a sentence a simple yet profound fact of life. "As a child of a broken home," he wrote of a character in *Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy*, the boy "was a natural watcher."

Obvious though it may be to anyone with first-hand experience, this insight—that children of broken homes are somehow different and that this difference includes but is not limited to a unique wariness toward the outside world—remains ferociously resisted in sociology both academic and popular. And not only there. At a time when hardly an extended family in the country is without broken branches somewhere on the tree, and when the going piety among sophisticates is that a family is whatever two or more consenting adults in possession of a child say it is, practically no one wants to ask the exceedingly unwelcome question of what effect, if any, widespread divorce in particular might be having on kids.

Even so, some scholars have valiantly asked and answered just that. Thanks to the groundbreaking work of those willing to buck resistance to the bad news—Judith Wallerstein, Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Sarah MacLanahan, Gary Sandefur, David Blankenhorn, Maggie Gallagher, Linda Waite, and others—an empirical record of the damages of broken homes has been available for some time now, welcome or not. Best-known among this scholarship is Wallerstein's unique

25-year study, summarized in *The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce*, which followed 131 children at intervals into adulthood.

Contrary to what almost all recognized authorities had been saying about divorce and its impact on children, what Wallerstein and her team found was exactly what no one wanted to see: widespread evidence of ongoing damage and difference. "Divorce," as she summarized a quarter-century of research in the introduction to that book,

is a life-transforming experience. After divorce, childhood is different. Adolescence is different. Adulthood—with the decision to marry or not and have children or not—is different. Whether the final outcome is good or bad, the whole trajectory of an individual's life is profoundly altered by the divorce experience.

This verdict—the social-science version of le Carré's literary fillip—is now thoroughly vindicated by Elizabeth Marquardt's bracing and important new book, *Between Two Worlds: The Inner Lives of Children of Divorce*. Based on a random survey of 1,500 women and men aged 18-35, as well as 70 in-depth interviews within that group, Marquardt and co-researcher Norval Glenn have delivered an empirical record that makes the appendices alone reason enough to study this book. In them one finds the fascinating differences of this random sample of young adults—half from divorced families and half from intact—manifest themselves repeatedly in the course of 125 probing survey questions.

Even so, the significance of this book goes deeper than its empirical contribution. In a bold move that will doubtless launch a thousand complaining missives from her fellow sociologists, Marquardt frames her discussion of these results in the first person, weaving her own personal story as a child of divorced parents in and out of the text. The polemical result ranges from effective to devastating. As a result, *Between Two*

Worlds achieves not only a breakthrough in empiricism but also in the quality most lacking elsewhere in current sociology: empathy for the children and former children of these homes.

Just how different is the difference that Marquardt and Glenn turn up between their samples? Begin with a few practicalities—say, whether the family operates as a center of gravity or not. For example, 32 percent of children of divorce say their family was not in the habit of sharing a daily meal—compared to 8 percent of the children of intact homes. Almost two-thirds of the divorced sample reports that "it was stressful in my family," compared to 25 percent of the intact sample. Only one-third of the divorced sample can strongly agree with the statement "children were at the center of my family"—as opposed to 63 percent of the intact sample. Many more examples confirm the perhaps unsurprising point: broken homes have less time and room for kids than those that are intact.

Then there are the more nebulous but nevertheless striking differences in outlook. Wallerstein had perspicaciously cited as common among her subjects "the fear that disaster was always waiting to strike without warning." This apprehensiveness is also confirmed by the subjects in *Between Two Worlds*. Simply put, the children of broken homes feel less protected and more embattled than their peers—an inner vulnerability that appears over and over in the gaps between the two samples. For example, although 70 percent of the divorced sample could report, "I generally felt emotionally safe," this compares to 93 percent of the kids from intact homes. Numerous of Marquardt's subjects—like the author herself—report a generalized apprehensiveness and dread of the world lasting well into adulthood. As one puts it and is echoed by others, "I always felt like I was watching out for something to go wrong. Not that I thought I was going to die or anything like that. But I always felt like things were lurking around corners."

In another finding certain to resonate with readers who share her background, Marquardt also reports that many of her respondents believe themselves prematurely aged compared to their peers. Once again, it is the continuing disparities in the sample that clinch the point. Some 58 percent of the divorced sample agreed with the statement, "I always felt like an adult, even when I was a little kid"—whereas only 37 percent of the intact sample expressed similar sad precocity. Likewise, over twice as many divorced children, almost 30 percent, report that they felt "too responsible" for taking care of a sibling, versus a mere 12.7 percent of the intact sample.

Among the most interesting results have to do with a subject that most contemporary sociologists have barely even thought to touch: the relationship between divorce and subsequent religious beliefs. At the outset of a chapter titled "Child-Sized Old Souls," the author notes that one of the study's major findings came as a surprise—the "strong connection between children of divorce and belief in God." That much established, however, the rest of the story connecting divorce to religion is exceedingly complicated, and makes for some of the most thought-provoking reading in the book.

"THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A GOOD DIVORCE," MARQUARDT SAYS IN SUMMARY OF HER RESEARCH, AND SHE IS RIGHT.

The fundamental and fascinating problem uncovered here by the Marquardt/Glenn survey is that, like it or not, the Judeo-Christian tradition has anthropomorphized the Deity in one particular way: by analogy to a wise, protective, loving, ever-present male parent. The fact that the vast majority of children of divorce do not associate those adjectives with their male biological parent makes for elemental, ongoing confusion and heartache well-documented via numerous telling quotes. At one point, for example, Marquardt asks her subjects to reflect on the idea of God as a parent, elaborating of one:

Will was mystified by the question. He had been angry at his father for years because of the way he treated Will's mother. When I asked Will if God is like a father or parent he looked puzzled. 'Yeah, I think a father is somebody who is your last string of hope,' he said slowly. 'He'll watch over you, make sure everything is going to be okay.' Then his voice faltered and he looked down at his hands in his lap. 'I'm drawing a blank,' he said. 'I'm just drawing a blank.'

Nor are even the "best" divorces immune to raising the most fundamental questions of identity. Says one woman whose Catholic parents had their marriage annulled, meaning theologically that it never existed: "That's something I don't think I've really come to grips with . . . I said, 'How can I not exist? If the marriage didn't exist, who am I? What am I?'"

In sum, *Between Two Worlds* confirms what seasoned observers of human nature will already know—that the children of broken homes do indeed "wear a mantle of seriousness and vigilance even today that sets them apart from their peers." To acknowledge as

much is not to demonize divorced parents. Many undertake their split under duress and in anguish, and some moreover find themselves separated from their child or spouse against their will. As Marquardt also documents, their children love them for the most part wherever they are—and many also go on to love stepparents and half-siblings and others brought into their lives in the wake of the breakup.

To insist on the legitimacy of the child's point of view is not to point a finger at the parents but rather to observe something else—that the tragedy of a divided family is no zero-

sum game. Of course critics will resist Marquardt's work the same way many did Wallerstein's—by complaining about the sample size and other methodological points, by arguing that correlation does not prove causality, and by continuing with the same kind of happy talk ("You're lucky—you have *two* homes!") that has helped to make an inner emotional hash of so many current and former children who know otherwise.

Moreover, it is a sure and sad fact of life that many of the people who ought to read this book will not have the personal stomach to do it. There are parents who do not want to hear the bad news about what they might be doing to their kids. There are policymakers who do not want any potential voters—meaning adults—to think badly of them for making divorce harder to get or for otherwise trying to rig incentives in favor of the natural family. And of course there are the activists now working hard to create even more of the sad world plumbed in such detail here—homes in which children are deprived of a mother or a father, all the while they are told that it's really all to the good.

Whatever its origin, the deep desire that some of us adults will feel to resist the message of this book is trumped by the authentic young voices of those who witness otherwise. "There is no such thing as a good divorce," Marquardt says in summary of her research, and she is right. At some point, we just have to be able to say that a broken home is a terrible thing. At some point, we just have to acknowledge that the absence of a biological parent for any reason—let alone in principle—is not only a fact of life, but also a tragedy from almost any child's point of view. Thanks to Elizabeth Marquardt's new book, we may just have taken a step forward on both counts. ■

Mary Eberstadt is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of Home-Along America: Why Today's Kids Are Overmedicated, Overweight, and More Troubled Than Ever Before, now in paperback (Sentinel).

[*The Awful End of Prince William the Silent: The First Assassination of a Head of State With a Handgun*, Lisa Jardine, HarperCollins, 144 pages]

The Bullets Are Working

"I remember thinking, 'The bullets are working.' I think I felt a little regret that they were working."

—Mark David Chapman after killing John Lennon

ON THE SAME DAY—July 10, 1584, in Delft, Holland—William the Silent, the architect of Dutch independence, died as a man and was reborn as a myth. Whig historians, above all John L. Motley in *The Rise of the Dutch Republic* (1856), hailed William as not merely a Protestant hero but *the* Protestant hero; the man who first weakened imperial Spain's tyranny; "first in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen"; and, better still, the *de facto* inventor of nationalism, which, as every Whig historian (and Balkan terrorist and English soccer-hoodlum and Hutu machete-wielder) knows, is A Good Thing.

The reaction against such hagiography came with a vehement Hispanophile, W.T. Walsh. In his 1937 life of William's arch-foe Philip II of Spain, Walsh emphasized inconvenient facts about William that Whigs ignored: notably his talent for intrigue, the sustained dirtiness of his propagandistic fighting, and his refusal to abandon Catholicism until the moment when a change of religion suited his interests. Yet Walsh, while more often right than wrong, so overstated his case—1937 was hardly the best possible year for calm thought about Spanish administration—as to make readers ask: if William had been such a soulless, blatantly two-faced creep, how did he inspire followers at all, let alone create a political movement formidable enough to threaten Habsburg sovereignty?

At any rate, later historians—Henry Kamen, Geoffrey Parker, and Sir Charles Petrie are three prominent names—have judiciously discarded both Walsh's wilder rhetorical excess and the Whigs' fairytale, thereby enabling us to appreciate William's true character. To this august list can now be added Lisa Jardine, most famous for her analyses of Erasmus and Francis Bacon. Neither Sir Galahad nor Beelzebub, William is best comprehended as an impressive, crafty politician who, dealt a poor political hand, played it with more skill than several of his contemporaries—including Philip's half-brother Don John of Austria—ever managed even after receiving every court card in the pack.

Why exactly had William's hand been so poor, compared with the gifts that Don John dissipated? Because both temperament and early circumstance ill equipped William with the requirements for a national leader. As a wealthy, cosmopolitan, fairly feckless aristocrat—who took his main title, the Principality of Orange, from a town in southern France—he acquired his first European prominence when 22 years old, in 1555. The occasion: Charles V's ceremonial abandonment of the emperor's role. Prematurely aged, Charles trusted William enough to lean on his arm in Brussels' palace before and during the abdication ceremony.

William earned his nickname "the Silent" through a prudence not natural but tactical. Amid doctrinal warfare he stood out during his youth, as a state councilor in the Netherlands, for his doctrinal vagueness. When he allied himself with protests against Spain's introduction of its Inquisition into the Low Countries, he operated through regional particularism rather than through religious conviction. After all, the Low Countries already possessed an Inquisition, "more rigorous"—as Philip himself said—"than the one here."

Maladroit overreaction by Philip, and to a lesser extent by his generalissimo, the Duke of Alba, did more than any other single process to drive William into permanent political opposition and

thence into discarding the Roman faith's observances altogether—though his marriage to a princess from anti-Habsburg Saxony also helped. Philip ordered in 1568, and Alba failed to prevent, the beheading of two Catholic nobles periodically associated with William: Count Egmont—of Beethoven overture fame—and Count Hornes. Ferocious drumrolls thundered forth as the victims approached the block, to drown out whatever last speeches they might utter. You can still see, in Brussels's main square, a plaque commemorating the double execution. This blunder gravely damaged centrist Catholic hopes of some confederate autonomy within either a Spanish or a Dutch Calvinist orbit. Thereafter, local Catholic moderates found themselves constituting a largely ineffectual third force caught between Spanish rule and the Calvinists, whom William alternately thwarted and defended.

The conflict's greatest puzzle is whether Spain could have won it, had Philip, always better esteemed by commoners than by the upper classes, visited the Netherlands in person. A later Spanish sovereign, Philip V, maintained that his predecessor's stay-at-home policy had been madness: "If I lose territories, it shall not be for that reason." Probably Philip V's assessment was correct. In 16th-century Europe, rebels who howled to the moon against a king's advisers usually refrained from attacking the king himself.

What remains certain is that the war's first stages—William's initial defeats, followed by cleverly improvised successes; Spain's military revival under Don John and, more lastingly, Philip's nephew the Duke of Parma; William's own attempts, at times vindicated, to keep local Catholics partly on side by ruling via Catholic surrogates like France's Duke of Anjou—not only defy epitomizing in a mere article but belong rather to the Low Countries' history than to William's own. Hostilities continued on and off—a fact worth remembering by modern believers in military "cakewalks"—for 80 years.

Missing Any Issues of The American Conservative?

Order today, and get a FREE copy of the first issue!

\$6 per issue postage paid.

Please indicate quantity:

October 7, 2002

FREE Vol. 1, No. 1

First Issue!

FREE with any paid order



December 2, 2002


___ Norman Mailer on Empire

March 24, 2003

___ Whose War?


February 2, 2004

___ Cheney Builds an Empire



March 15, 2004

___ Gibson's Passion



April 26, 2004

___ Pinocchio Presidency

July 5, 2004

___ Reagan Commemorative Issue

See "Archive" at www.amconmag.com for a description of all issues

___ Other issue. Date _____

___ Other issue. Date _____

☐ **5 issues published in 2002**

☐ **All 24 issues published in 2003**

☐ **All 24 issues published in 2004**

FREE Vol. 1, No. 1 with paid order

Name _____

Please print

Address _____

City _____

State _____

Zip _____

TAC51107

Send your order with payment to:

The American Conservative
1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120
Arlington, VA 22209

Through such hostilities, William, like most monarchs of his time, moved with amazing freedom and remarkably few guards. The lowliest bank teller now enjoys, or endures, better security than prevailed back then for the mightiest princes, even for Elizabeth I, more cautious than most. In 1582, one Jean Jauregay, "a short, ill-dressed, unassuming individual," fired into William a bullet that "pass[ed] through his mouth, somehow without damaging either tongue or cheek, and exiting ... between jaw and ear." Within months the victim had resumed governing.

Another malcontent of intellectual pretensions, Balthasar Gérard, had lost what little reason he possessed by his work as secret agent for Philip. Two years before Jauregay's attempt on William's life, Philip had announced a prize of 25,000 gold crowns for anyone who slew William. This gesture utterly typified Philip's fantastic ineptitude at public relations. Any serious tyrant in Philip's job would, first, have realized that declaring open season on one ruler would endanger all and, second, have given some goon a nod and a wink in private.

Eventually Gérard, after convincing William of his *bona fides* as a loyal Protestant eager to spy on the Duke of Parma's camp, fired his chic new wheel-lock pistol thrice at point-blank range into William's chest. Jardine has done splendid detective work concerning how Gérard gained access to William's home, the fake letters of recommendation he employed, and where he acquired his lethal fashion accessory.

What Gérard's punishment lacked in prettiness it compensated for in drama. The Dutch authorities lived too early to use the actual phrase "zero tolerance," but they revealed to Gérard a conspicuous flair in the underlying concept. They whipped him, smeared salt into his wounds, chopped his breasts off, hung lead weights from his feet, tore away most of his flesh with pincers, and according to one account poured urine over him. Then, having removed and burnt his bowels, they quartered him. At some unspecified point, he breathed his last.

Jardine's fascinating sidelights upon Renaissance gun culture indicate that Gérard could have suffered fewer indignities had he finished off William with a knife. Elizabeth I might also have been less spooked by a stabbing than by a shooting. As it was, William's murder scared her into giving Dutch Protestants the open practical support she previously withheld, having regarded them less as friends than as dangerous subversives against the flawed but indubitably royal Spanish *polis*. In her day, the subject of whether, and when, assassinating a head of state could be advocated on religious grounds occupied theologians' and bureaucrats' minds to a remarkable degree. But we cannot afford to deride such preoccupations, given the current ideological climate. Perhaps some of Jardine's allusions to fatwas, to Princess Di's end, and to Arafat's final years veer a bit towards modishness. Yet her understanding of the parallels, as well as of the differences, between William's world and our own provokes nod after nod of sympathetic assent.

At the time Gérard caught up with him, William was in partial eclipse, never having fully recovered from the 1582 assault. Possibly Gérard's gunfire just hastened a political doom already inevitable, much as JFK's and Martin Luther King's authority had sunk to embarrassing lows long before screaming headlines acquainted us all with Oswald and James Earl Ray. Still, maybe a truer analogue to William's position is that of the mid-1960s Nixon: several times defeated, but never to be counted out.

A somewhat patronizing review in Britain's *Daily Telegraph* called Jardine's survey "the perfect length for an evening's read." To the contrary, it rewards repeated pondering for weeks after being first examined and validates the dust-jacket's assurance: "There are moments when a single event topples the most apparently certain of outcomes, when one intervention changes the course of history." ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.

[*Lion of Hollywood: The Life and Legend of Louis B. Mayer*, Scott Eyman, Simon and Schuster, 596 pages]

Family Man in Babylon

By Clark Stooksbury

OTTO VON BISMARCK famously said, "Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made." After reading *Lion of Hollywood*, Scott Eyman's biography of Louis B. Mayer, one is tempted to add movies to the category of things best not seen being made. In the classic MGM films of the 1930s, the images on screen were of glamour and beauty. Behind the camera, the reality was very different.

It was different in the obvious sense that most of the movies in those days were filmed on a studio lot. What looked like a castle or grand hotel was actually just a set with no roof and a mass of lights, cables, and supports just out of range of the camera. A closer look might reveal that the short leading man is always positioned in a way to appear taller than his leading lady. The image was also false in the sense that the people making the films didn't come close to living up to the values depicted on screen.

Although his name is not as well known as some of his stars, such as Clark Gable and Greta Garbo, L.B. Mayer is a critical figure in 20th-century history. During his reign as the most powerful man in Hollywood, movies were far more central to American culture than they are today. In 1930, for example, 65 percent of the population attended movies every week, compared to less than 10 percent in 2000. Despite his great power, after the merger that created Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer in 1924, Mayer was an employee of Loew's Incorporated, which had previously owned Metro Pictures. When the studio's declining performance in the years after

the Second World War weakened his position, he was fired.

For its first two decades, MGM was the dominant studio, consistently making money and earning Oscar nominations. Eyman notes "in the 1930s, MGM came to symbolize an alternate reality from the drabness and squalor of the worldwide Depression, an escape into a dream world of Park Avenue swells. ... For audiences at home and abroad, MGM was Hollywood at its most Hollywood in the best sense of the word." *Grand Hotel* (1932) and *Dinner at Eight* (1933) are quintessential MGM films. Both feature John and Lionel Barrymore and Wallace Beery. The former includes Greta Garbo and Joan Crawford; to the latter add Jean Harlow and Marie Dressler. Both feature numerous interlocking stories involving rich and beautiful people. It was on the basis of such films that Mayer built his studio. He didn't get directly involved in the creative process, but he did make sure to preserve the proper appearance of his films. If a script called for a woman to be rising from bed, Mayer still wanted her to look fabulous. Glamour trumped reality. Jean Harlow first appears in *Dinner at Eight* sitting up in bed wearing a gown she might have worn to the Oscars.

Irving Thalberg is an essential part of the MGM story. Alternately known as the "boy wonder" or "boy genius" of MGM, the sickly Thalberg rose almost instantaneously from being a secretary to Carl Laemmle of Universal Pictures to being in charge of production at that company at the tender age of 21. In 1923, while still a very young man, he joined L.B. Mayer Productions. According to Eyman, part of Thalberg's appeal to Mayer—other than his already demonstrated talent—was ethnic and class-based. "Mayer had the Russian Jew's automatic respect for the more learned and aristocratic German Jew." Their father/son-like relationship soured over the years when Thalberg, after an illness, ceased being in charge of production for the studio and was allowed to form an independent unit within the

company. Eyman describes a "cult of Thalberg" within the studio whose "central doctrine was that Irving Thalberg was a creative genius and Mayer was a glad-handing pencil-pusher—a theology Irving implicitly believed." Creative genius or not, Thalberg's heart was damaged by a bout with rheumatic fever as a child, and his poor health led to his death at age 37 in 1936. His funeral was the "Hollywood equivalent of a state occasion. . . . Every studio observed five minutes of silence, and MGM suspended operations for the day." Eyman quotes an MGM executive opining at the funeral that the studio would "begin to feel the squeeze" within two years after Thalberg's demise. That would not be the case, as the studio's run of success lasted until the mid-1940s.

Both of Mayer's daughters married into the movie business. Irene Mayer, who had considerable experience as a Broadway producer, married David O. Selznick. Selznick is an industry legend on par with his father-in-law. He worked for several studios, including MGM, where he produced *Dinner at Eight*, before forming Selznick International Pictures. His greatest accomplishment was the Herculean task of making, with MGM backing, *Gone With The Wind* in 1939. He followed that with Alfred Hitchcock's classic *Rebecca* in 1940. Both movies won the Academy Award for Best Picture.

Men as talented as Selznick are few and far between, and Mayer's other son-in-law, William Goetz, married to Mayer's daughter Edie, pales in comparison. Mayer invested heavily in the creation of 20th Century Pictures and brought in Goetz as a partner. He later gave a portion of his stock in that company to Goetz and Edie. Eyman writes, "for a man of Mayer's orthodox, patriarchal sensibilities, Edie deserved an equivalent standing with Irene, and if her husband couldn't earn it, then he, L.B., would have to buy it." Later, when Goetz left what had become 20th Century Fox, Mayer gave him one million dollars to form an independent production company.

Goetz would earn the enmity of Mayer—a staunch Republican—for supporting Adlai Stevenson in 1952. He could have forgiven the political apostasy, except for one detail. Mayer was fired by MGM in 1951 after the studio had struggled for several years. The following year, Goetz co-hosted a Stevenson fundraiser with Dore Schary—the man who engineered Mayer's removal from the studio that bore his name. Mayer was so enraged by the incident that he broke off all relations with Goetz and Edie. It was a very strong statement from a man who put such emphasis on the importance of family.

No one studio, not even MGM, could totally define a decade, but Mayer's studio came close in the 1930s. The glamour and glitz on the screen contrasted sharply with the bleak economic times, and that was no accident. When the classic six-movie *Thin Man* series was released on DVD recently, it went to the top of the Amazon.com sales chart. This inspired a *New York Times* column by Adam Cohen who, referring to the

novel by Dashiell Hammett that inspired the series, wrote, "Hammett knew that in hard times, when people opened a popular magazine or a novel, they wanted to read about penthouses, not breadlines." The same is true of the movies.

MGM's success began to wane after World War II. The studio did not adapt to the public's changing tastes. Sometimes when it did, it was over Mayer's objections. "After 1945," Eyman writes, "the memorable MGM movies tended to be musicals, or exuberant adventures like *The Three Musketeers*. ... The studio tried to come up with the bleak thrillers posterity would call film noir, which were increasingly popular, but MGM values were simply not compatible with noir." When the studio achieved success with *The Postman Always Rings Twice* in 1946, Mayer told a colleague that the film was "evil."

The studio also had a poor reputation with directors at a time when their prestige was increasing in the industry. Clarence Brown, described as a "Mayer loyalist," enjoyed the greater freedom he was allowed when he was loaned out once to 20th Century Fox. Elia Kazan was dismayed by his experience directing *The Sea of Grass* (1947) for MGM. The script was finalized, and the studio had already designed the sets and costumes. When he complained about the realism of the costumes, suggesting that the setting was supposed to be the "backcountry," he was told by the costume designer that film takes place in "Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer land, where you and I are sitting this minute."

The importance of family and family values is evident in MGM's movies. Mayer was fond of pointing to the pictures of his two daughters on his desk and proclaiming that nothing in his movies would embarrass his children. Of course, even the films of which Mayer disapproved are tame compared to movies today. Mayer was proud of the Andy Hardy movies and Judy Garland-Mickey Rooney musicals. Eyman says that Mayer "took an overt moral position in his movies—a provincial

nineteenth-century Victorian propriety." It is a rather quaint notion for the head of an organization that seems at times to have been formed for the purpose of debauchery. The studio featured an opium den and had a Christmas party that regularly turned into an orgy. On top of that, the studio publicity apparatus worked to ensure that no information damaging to a star's or the studio's reputation came to light. There was no reason for the public to know the true nature of a star such as Spencer Tracy, famous for playing Father Flanagan in *Boys Town*, among other roles.

The studio's publicity chief, Howard Strickling, described the drill if Tracy was publicly drunk and causing a disturbance. "We kept an official-looking ambulance on call at the studio. Every bar owner and hotel manager in the area knew what to do if Tracy showed up drunk and began causing a problem. They'd phone me, and I'd phone [MGM police chief] Whitey [Hendry], and the ambulance would take off with a couple of security men dressed as paramedics. They'd go to the scene, strap Tracy to a stretcher, and then rush him away in the ambulance ..." The 1933 MGM picture *Bombshell* ably satirized the machinations of the studio publicity man, although in that film the publicist sullies the reputation of the title character—played by real-life bombshell Jean Harlow—to increase her value as a sex symbol.

It would be easy to indict Mayer and his studio for hypocrisy, pointing to the yawning gap between the behavior that the movies depicted on screen and that of the people making the films. But that would miss the point. L.B. Mayer wanted anything but realism in his movies. Part of the price of operating a dream factory was tolerating—and often whitewashing—the behavior of the creative types who worked inside. It was a price that Mayer was willing to pay, and at times the results were magic. ■

Clark Stooksbury writes from Knoxville, Tennessee.

United States Postal Service			
Statement of Ownership, Management, and Circulation			
1. Publication Title		2. Publication Number	
The American Conservative		93005	
3. Issue Frequency		4. Annual Subscription Price	
Bi-Weekly		\$49.97	
5. Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication (Street, city, county, state, and ZIP+4)		6. Complete Mailing Address of Headquarters or General Business Office of Publisher (Not printer)	
1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120 Arlington, VA 22209		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120 Arlington, VA 22209	
7. Full Names and Complete Mailing Addresses of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor (Do not leave blank)			
Publisher (Name and complete mailing address)			
The American Conservative, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209			
Editor (Name and complete mailing address)			
Scott McConnell, Patrick Buchanan, Taki Theodoracopulos at The American Conservative, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209			
Managing Editor (Name and complete mailing address)			
Kara Haglins The American Conservative 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209			
8. Owner (Do not leave blank. If the publication is owned by a corporation, give the name and address of the corporation immediately followed by the names and addresses of all stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of the total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, give the names and addresses of the individual owners. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, give its name and address as well as those of each individual owner. If the publication is published by a nonprofit organization, give its name and address.)			
Full Name		Complete Mailing Address	
Scott McConnell		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209	
Patrick Buchanan		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209	
Taki Theodoracopulos		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209	
Ronald Burr		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209	
Jon Utley		1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209	
9. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders Owning or Holding 1 Percent or More of Total Amount of Bonds, Mortgages, or Other Securities. If none, check box.			
None			
Full Name		Complete Mailing Address	
10. Publication Title			
The American Conservative			
11. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below		12. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below	
October 10, 2005		October 10, 2005	
13. Extent and Nature of Circulation		14. Issue Date for Circulation Data Below	
Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months		No. Copies of Single Issue Published Nearest to Filing Date	
a. Total Number of Copies (Net press run)		17,450	
b. Paid and/or Requested Circulation (Sum of 1, 2, and 3)		12,106	
1. Paid (Include advertiser's proof and exchange copies)		10,794	
2. Paid in Advance (Include advertiser's proof and exchange copies)		0	
3. Paid Through Carriers and Other Non-USPS Paid Distribution (Include advertiser's proof and exchange copies)		1,296	
c. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means)		0	
d. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means)		13,362	
e. Free Distribution Outside the Mail (Carriers or other means)		12,090	
f. Total Paid and/or Requested Circulation (Sum of 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, and 1f)		12,106	
g. Total Distribution (Sum of 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, and 1g)		12,106	
h. Total (Sum of 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, and 1h)		17,450	
i. Copies not Distributed		3,393	
j. Total (Sum of 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1g, 1h, and 1i)		17,450	
k. Percent Paid and/or Requested Circulation (Divide 1b by 1j and multiply by 100)		69%	
l. Publication of Statement of Ownership		11/07/05	
m. Publication required 48 hours prior to the issue of this publication		Publication not required	
n. Signature and Title of Editor, Publisher, Business Manager, or Owner		Date	
Scott McConnell		9/30/05	

Statesman and Swordsman



Duff Cooper was a brave, farseeing British statesman and hedonist of the '30s and '40s, a man of taste and literary skill, a great womanizer and a

very good diarist. He has now been dead for exactly 50 years, and his son, Viscount Norwich, the Byzantine expert and writer, has published his diaries from the year 1915 until the end of 1951. I first heard of Cooper when I read his definitive biography of Talleyrand, a book still in print and which made the French statesman come alive—no small feat if one takes into account the mask of exaggerated manners he had perfected. (Talleyrand, like Cooper, chased the fairer sex nonstop in the middle of wars and political crises, topping it off by seducing three generations of the duchesses of Dino.)

Duff Cooper became a household name in England in 1919, when he married the greatest beauty of her time, Lady Diana Manners, daughter of the Duke of Rutland, who was courted and admired by everyone but who chose to marry the penniless civil servant and inveterate philanderer. Diana, however, was the daughter of the duchess of Rutland but not of the duke. Her real father was another great swordsman, Harry Cust, yet the duke loved his illegitimate daughter even more than his other children. *Noblesse oblige*, I suppose. I had the opportunity to meet Lady Diana back in 1986, but by then her great beauty, as well as her brain, was gone, and I do believe she mistook me for ... Talleyrand.

Joie de vivre is the hallmark of the Cooper diaries. Duff loved life and enjoyed it to the full at a time when life could really be enjoyed. The drinking and partying were heroic. Having survived the slaughter of the Great War, the boys were out for a good time. As were the girls. Cooper served with distinction

in the First World War, having volunteered the moment he passed his physical, then entered Parliament in 1924 as a Conservative and went on to become First Lord of the Admiralty, a post from which he resigned in 1938 in protest against the Munich agreement. He returned to the cabinet in 1940 and later was appointed ambassador to Paris, where he remained until the end of 1947. The Paris parts of the diaries are my favorites, probably as I knew some of the people mentioned. Gaston Palewski, lover of Nancy Mitford and close adviser to de Gaulle, arrogant and a charming womanizer, had me and my first wife to

a few: "Monday April 26, 1915. Rupert Brooke has died of sunstroke at Lemnos. Terribly sad. I knew him well. A very good poet and a very beautiful man." "July 11, 1916. Dined at 10 Downing Street. The Prime Minister and Mrs Asquith, Lords Curzon and Kitchener. Kitchener said he could take Baghdad but couldn't hold it. Curzon said, Don't take it unless you can hold it. Curzon is right." "September 18, 1916. Prime Minister's eldest son killed in action. It is the worst shock I have ever had. I wish I were with Diana to comfort her. Poor Mrs Asquith ..." "September 27, 1916. Mark Tennant and his cousin Bimbo have both been killed. One grows callous ..." (This incident is not in the diaries, but when Mark Tennant arrived fresh to the front, a muddy sergeant looked at him, smiled ruefully and said,


JOIE DE VIVRE IS THE HALLMARK OF THE COOPER DIARIES. DUFF LOVED LIFE AND ENJOYED IT TO THE FULL AT A TIME WHEN LIFE COULD REALLY BE ENJOYED.

lunch at the Elysee back in 1967—he had eyes for my sweet 20-year-old—and Cooper describes him perfectly 35 years before. Vicomtesse Marie-Laure de Noailles, collector, novelist, poet, and patron of the arts and artists, had a "disgraceful" war because of her penchant for good-looking young German officers. I was invited to her "salon" whilst in my twenties and she in her seventies. It was one of the few times I've backed off in my life.

Plus ça change, as they say. The bittersweet parts are those during the first war when news arrives daily of friends, schoolmates, and relatives killed after volunteering for duty. All upper-class men went off as quickly as they could be measured for a uniform, and the same applied for the other side. Here are

"We're going over the wire in five minutes, sir, you better write to your mother because you're most likely not coming back." Tennant did write a short letter. "Dearest Mama. The noise ... and the people! Your loving son, Mark." He died immediately while leading the charge.) "August 10, 1918. Brassey is an attractive boy of whom I am quite fond and who is fond of me. He is fresh from Eton [Cooper's school] and fresh in every way ... Brassey is killed in action later that day ..."

And on it goes. While reading the diaries I also read a Bob Herbert column decrying the present bloodshed in Iraq as a reckless, indefensible war that has been avoided like the plague by the children of the privileged classes. Think about that and weep. ■



A peaceful political revolution to overthrow the current liberal/socialist political order and replace it with a Liberty Based Society!

This book will feature prominently in the 2008 Presidential Primary campaign!

RECLAIMING LIBERTY

by

**James Ronald Kennedy,
co-author of *The South Was Right!***


**100 Years of Conservative Failures
Explained and Exposed!**

A Liberty Based Society were *we the people* of the Sovereign States are the final arbiters of the extent of Federal power!

- Total taxing authority (local, state, & federal) limited to maximum of 10%.
- An end to inflation and the establishment of sound, gold based monetary policy.
- A free market solution to the issues of a bankrupt Social Security System, a failing public education system, and unaffordable healthcare.
- Rejection of political correctness and a business as usual political regime; a return to individual responsibility, civility, and personal accountability.

Available at bookstores, online bookstores, or autographed copies via:
Liberty Books • P.O. Box 1271 • Madisonville, LA 70447
\$27.00 shipping included

OTHER BOOKS BY THE KENNEDY BROTHERS:



If we keep doing what we have always done, we will end up with what we have always had — it's time for a change — it's time for Liberty

For more information visit our web site www.kennedytwins.com or
www.libertybasedsociety.org